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The academia and finance professionals have debated for decades over the origin of the private 
equity funds’ superior returns. The historical returns show that private equity investors have 
been able to generate higher returns than the markets on average year after year. As a conse-
quence, the focal sector has grown globally rapidly. According to a report by Bureau van Dijk 
(2019), private equity investments accounted globally 26 % of the total M&A deal count in year 
2018 and 16 % in terms of deal value. The development is evident also in Finland. In 2018, Finnish 
companies attracted the most VC funding of all European countries in comparison to the GDP 
(FVCA, 2019).  
 
The impact of private equity transactions has been studied extensively yet most of the literature 
focus on economic performance and corporate governance framework. Although innovation is 
one of the key drivers for economic growth, research on technological change has remained 
slight. This thesis contributes to the academic literature by trying to fill that gap by combining 
these three elements. In other words, the purpose is to study the relationships between private 
equity investments, board members’ social linkages and post-acquisition innovations. 
 
The data sample used for the empirical analysis comprises 401 venture capital and buyout deals 
that completed between years 2010 and 2015 and where the target is a company registered in 
Finland. The sample contains in total 340 individual firms.  
 
The empirical analysis is conducted utilising quantitative methods. Logistic panel regression 
measures the propensity for a firm to file an eventually granted patent application. In order to 
measure the post-investment innovation intensity, an OLS panel regression is applied. Finally, to 
examine whether the private equity investors’ aim is in the end more on spurring innovation or 
on product development and commercialisation, an OLS panel regression is employed to meas-
ure firm performance in term of sales.  
 
The results show that increased social capital correlates positively with both innovation and firm 
performance. However, innovation activities prior to receiving the investment have stronger im-
pact and implies that instead of spurring new innovations, private equity investors focus on de-
veloping the existing innovations. The results for firm performance also show that PE investors’ 
focus is more on financial engineering as there is no correlation between increased innovation 
and increased sales. 
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The academic community and the corporate world have both been looking for the magic 
wand private equity (PE) investors are holding as they seem to have been able to gener-
ate significantly higher returns than the markets consecutively for decades. The aca-
demia also debates over the objectives and incentives of private equity investors to-
wards their target companies. However, before diving deeper into value creation pro-
cesses of entrepreneurial minds of private equity investors, let’s start from the beginning 
by defining what private equity is and where it all began. 
 
Private equity is the opposite of public equity, i.e. being listed on public stock exchange. 
Often private equity investing is connected to the concept of active ownership. However, 
the definition of private equity as a term is relatively context specific. Typically, PE invest-
ments are understood to describe investments in companies at mature stage. In a sense 
also Venture Capital (VC) investments are private equity investments. Therefore, the 
broad definition of PE covers investments in private companies at any phase, all the way 
from seed funding to mature and declining and/or restructuring. Reckoning with the re-
search set-up, the narrow definition is used; PE- and VC  terms are kept apart in order to 
study and compare them by their distinguishing features. 
 
Private equity sector in present form is said to have emerged from KKR’s buyout of Hou-
daille Industries in 1979. Since then the growth has been rapid, starting from the United 
States, reaching the United Kingdom in 1990’s and thereafter spreading to Asia and Eu-
rope in the 2000s (Klein, Chapman, & Mondelli, 2013). 
 
Globally private equity has strengthened its role as a form of funding a year after year. 
Excluding the peak years of 2006 and 2007, the trend has been positive ever since 1996. 
In succession to the Global Financial Crisis, investors have been more careful with the 
target firms and focusing on firms that are less sensitive to changes in business cycles. 




Private equity sector does not have a standardised vocabulary and terms; thus statistics 
differ depending on the source. Despite the lack of unionised language, the significance 
of private equity investments is evident. According to Bureau Van Dijk, the long-term 
trend on deal count is positive. Private equity deals (including private equity and venture 
capital) accounted for 26% of the total number of 97,709 M&A deals announced and 
completed worldwide in 2018. In terms of deal value, a total of USD 825,766 million was 
invested through PE and VC investors which equals 15.6 % of the total value of M&A 
deals. (Bureau Van Dijk, 2019) 
 
Europe, and especially the Nordic countries have increased their attraction as targets for 
foreign PE funds during the past few years. In 2018, Finnish companies received the most 
VC funding of all European countries in comparison to the GDP. In total, EUR 479 million 
was invested in Finnish start-up firms. In terms of buyout investments, Finland climbed 
ten positions up to fourth place after Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. (FVCA, 
2019) 
 
A recent study by KPMG Finland and Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) (2019) 
presents the impact of private equity investors have had on their target firms in Finland. 
Research shows that on average the three-year cumulative average growth rate (CAGR) 
of portfolio companies (PC) of Finnish private equity funds has been 22.8% between 
years 2010 to 2017. That is 19 percentage points more than in the control group. The 
growth is reasoned with strategic expertise, development of reporting and management 
systems, creation of new compensation and engagement models as well as the contacts 
and social networks which the private equity investors bring into the target company. On 
the other hand, growth comes from the firm’s continuous ability to increase perfor-





Innovation is found to be an essential driver to succeed in competitive markets in the 
long run (Hill & Snell, 1989). A study by Kortum and Lerner (2000) examines issued pa-
tents in the US between year 1965 and 1992 and find that venture capital is positively 
associated with the number of issued patents. Moreover, the study shows that activities 
of venture capitalists explain some 8 % of the industrial innovation in 1983 to 1992.   
 
More recently, a report by World Intellectual Property Organization (2019) shows that 
innovation, measured in terms of patent application, has increased worldwide for 15 
years in a row except in 2009 amid the financial crisis. In total, 3.3 million patent appli-
cations were filed in 2018. China, the U.S. and Japan lead the race in absolute number 
of applications, yet when compared to applications per unit of GDP Finland rises to 7th 
following Denmark and Sweden. The number of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) appli-
cations filed globally by Finnish companies increased by 14.7% from 2017 to 2018.  
 
The situation where private equity investments and innovation have increased signifi-
cantly and especially Finland during the past decade creates an intriguing set-up for a 
research. Parpaleix, Levillain and Blanche (2018) note that in the long run the key ele-
ment for business growth is the development of capability to sustain innovation. There-
fore, it is important to study the drivers behind innovation in order to preserve economic 
growth.  
 
On the other hand, Jensen (1989) argue that private equity investors generate economic 
efficiencies through superior corporate governance practices. After the acquisition, pri-
vate equity investors are known to revamp the firm inside out. That means also changing 
the directors of the executive board, management team, and sometimes the CEO. New 
board members are often a “professional board members” or experts of a specific indus-
try or business model etcetera. Furthermore, these individuals have knowledge and skills 
that are needed to develop the company according to mutual goals set by the investors 
and the company together. These experts are also often well-connected and have multi-
ple board seats in other firms. Consequently, their personal social network and social 
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capital is high. Although, a logical assumption would be that higher social capital brings 
added value the case is not so simple. This study focuses on the added value the external 
linkages bring to support firm innovation and firm performance. The results will then 
help the private equity investors to improve the structure of the board as the board dy-
namics is important factor for it to work as a team as Golden and Zajac (2001) argue that 
as the number of directors increases it may persuade other inconveniences such as free-
riding and emergency of factions. Alongside the benefit for the companies that are seek-
ing for funding from VC and BO investors, the results of this study provide guidance on 
the practices the investors actually apply in the company and what can be expected post-
acquisition. In practice, the pro is that the members of management team in the target 
company know the right questions to focus on in the negotiations and avoid misleading. 
Next chapter seizes more profoundly on the specific research questions. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The impact of private equity transactions has been studied extensively yet most of the 
literature focus on economic performance and corporate governance framework. In ad-
dition, studies by Achleitner, Braun and Engel (2011) and Ughetto (2010) remark the lack 
of profound research on value creation of private equity mechanisms. Moreover, alt-
hough innovation is one of the key drivers for economic growth, research on technolog-
ical change have remained slight. This thesis contributes to academic literature by trying 
to fill that gap by combining these three elements. In other words, the purpose is to 
study the relationships between private equity investments, board members’ social in-
terlocks and post-investment innovations. 
 
There are several research questions for my study to answer to. First of all, the purpose 
of private equity investor is to maximize the target’s financial and operational perfor-
mance. In order to do so, they often change board members to individuals who are be-
lieved to have the skills and connections to improve the company. The research question 
then is do new board members add value and increase the performance? Secondly, how 




In terms of innovation, the aim is to examine the relationship between social networks 
and innovation. Research question is stated as do higher social capital and wider social 
networks increase ability to sustain or even increase innovation. Those questions are 
also the base for the first hypothesis for the research:  
 
H0: Increase in social capital of the executive board leads to decrease in firm innovation 
H1: Increase in social capital of the executive board leads to increase in firm innovation 
 
Lastly, I will put all above-mentioned together. If social capital drives innovation and pri-
vate equity investors can bring added value to the firm by changing board members, do 
those specific new board members bring that particular addition to innovation and could 
partly explain the excessive growth in portfolio companies. Hence, the second hypothe-
sis is: 
 
H0: Increase in social capital of the executive board decrease financial performance of 
the target company 
H1: Increase in social capital of the executive board increase financial performance of the 
target company 
 
1.2 Structure of the study 
The structure of the paper is following. First, the private equity sector and its character-
istics are defined. That chapter includes discussion of different transaction and fund 
types and the structure of a private equity fund. After that, the theoretical framework is 
presented. Chapter presents the most common theories of corporate governance and 
social capital. The theoretical part of the study is finalized with prior empirical results. 
Discussion is built around value creation and findings on how private equity investors 




Empirical part of this study starts with presentation of data used in actual analysis. First 
is presented the procedure of data collection and then a detailed description of all the 
variables used in the analysis. After that is presented the methodology for the analysis 
that comprises three different methods: descriptive statistics, logistic regression and or-
dinary least squares method. Chapter empirical results naturally presents the findings of 
empirical analysis that uses the aforementioned methods. The results are discussed in 
the final chapter before drawing the conclusion.  
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2 Private equity 
This chapter defines the concept of private equity to help to understand the overall in-
dustry. It starts by defining the key terms and presenting the industry characteristics. 
Following that are introduced the different transaction and ownership types and the 
chapter finishes by discussing the ownership flexibility and influence. 
 
2.1 Definition and characteristics 
In its broadest sense, private equity (PE) means the opposite of public equity. Invest Eu-
rope (previously European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, EVCA) defines 
private equity as follows: “Private equity is a form of equity investment into private com-
panies not listed on the stock exchange. It is a medium to long-term investment, charac-
terised by active ownership.  Private equity builds better businesses by strengthening 
management expertise, delivering operational improvements and helping companies to 
access new markets.” 
 
Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) (2019) refers to private equity as investments 
in companies which are not quoted on stock markets but have good potential for devel-
opment. Private equity is therefore an umbrella term for alternative investments that 
comprises investments in private companies at all stages of growth (EVCA, 2007). In or-
der to distinguish the differences between the investment types this research refers to 
the term PE as the private equity sector in general regardless of the growth stage of the 
target company. Distinction is made according to different fund types which are pre-
sented in chapter 2.2.  
 
2.2 Private equity fund types 
Private equity investments can be divided into two categories: buyouts and venture cap-
ital. Buyout (BO) funds typically invest in companies that are more mature than venture 
capitalist portfolio companies but still growing. They focus on companies at expansion 
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or development stage where the business is already running and generating profits. New 
capital is used to for example add production capacity and sales power, finance acquisi-
tions, develop new products and/or enhance the working capital of the firm. Some buy-
out funds are specialized in companies suffering from financial distress or which are oth-
erwise in turnaround point in their life cycle. (EVCA, 2007) 
 
Venture capital funds invest in companies at earlier stage in company life cycle. That 
includes seed, start-up and later-stage funding. In seed funding stage the business is in 
research phase, developing and designing the idea or concept and it has not yet been 
properly accelerated. Thus, investments made during the phase in question are often 
personal, made by individuals such as the founder(s) of the company and/or a business 
angel. (EVCA 2007; Virtanen 1996: 97) Focus of this thesis is particularly in private equity 
funds and hence seed funding is not included in the scope of research.  
 
Venture capital funds look for companies with high growth potential and therefore their 
scope is often on innovative sectors, such as electronics, IT, life sciences and biotechnol-
ogy. These companies are usually in start-up phase and the financing received from in-
vestors is used for product research and development, initial marketing and employee 
training. At later-stage of venture capital, the product has been developed and the fi-
nancing is need for commercialisation and selling but the company is not yet profit-mak-
ing. These are typically third or fourth financing rounds (EVCA, 2007; Invest Europe, 
2017).  
 
The level of innovation is at its peak at this stage but at the same time risk of failure is 
also the highest (EVCA, 2007). In fact, Morgan and Abetti (2004) state high technology 
ventures to be so risky that venture capital and private equity are the only possible fi-
nanciers. Furthermore, apart from difference in company development stages, venture 
capital and buyout funds differ in the size of their investments. Venture capitalists invest 
in minority stakes and take overall a more passive role in the company than the funds 
that are focused in buyouts. Buyout funds on the contrary tend to acquire majority or 
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controlling stakes of the portfolio companies and at the same time take stronger control 
over the company (Invest Europe, 2017). Different transaction types and forms of com-
pany takeovers are discussed more in chapter 2.2.1. 
 
VC and PE funds also differ in their investment objectives. According to British Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA) generally VC funds invest in companies 
that have a short if any history of profitability and are cash hungry. Private equity funds’ 
scope is on the other hand in more mature companies. Also, they often focus on reduc-
ing inefficiencies and stimulate business growth. (BVCA, n.d.) 
 
In addition to VC and BO funds Invest Europe (2017) presents three other fund types: 
generalist fund, growth fund and mezzanine fund. Growth funds make usually minority 
investments companies that are at more mature stage. These firms are in need of financ-
ing to expand, improve their business operations and/or enter new markets. Generalist 
funds do not have a particular strategy in terms of development level of the company 
and therefore tend to invest in companies at all stages. Mezzanine funds are the pioneers 
of financial engineering within private equity industry as these funds use a hybrid of debt 
and equity utilizing equity-based options (e.g. warrants) and lower-priority (sub-ordi-
nated) debt. 
 
2.2.1   Buyout types 
Incumbent academic literature for private equity comprehends several ways to classify 
different PE transactions. Typically, transactions are divided into outside-driven and in-
side-driven transactions. Figure 1 presents the division of buyout types and most com-





The most common types of outside-driven transactions are leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 
management buy-ins (MBIs) and institutional (or investor-led) buyouts (IBOs). LBOs are 
often cited as the typical PE transactions due to PE funds mostly financing their invest-
ments using a substantial share of debt capital (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). IBO is a 
transaction where there are only institutional acquirers. However, an IBO can be related 
to LBO in case the new investors utilize leverage. The key element in outside-driven 
transactions is the replacement of the incumbent management team. In IBO and LBO 
transactions the new owners bring new managers whereas, in MBI transaction the new 
managers are also the owners as they invest personally in the target company (Gilligan 
& Wright, 2014, p. 216; Talmor & Vasvari, 2011, p. 271; Wood & Wright, 2009).  
 
In inside-driven transactions, the existing management team acquires the company pos-
sibly alongside a PE firm. In management buyout (MBO), only the management team 
takes part in the takeover but in management-led employee buyout (MEBO) also the 
company employees are offered an equity stake of the firm (Wood & Wright, 2009). 
These transactions can be also LBOs without an outsider takeover as the acquirers rarely 
have enough capital without the utilization of leverage.  
 
MBI and MBO’s differences occur in the level of information as the existing management 
team has more information about the company. A hybrid combining features of both 
insider- and outsider-driven transactions is called BIMBO. It is a mix of MBI and MBO 
that is created to help reducing the informational asymmetries in MBIs (Wood & Wright 
2009).  
 
Figure 1: Summary of buyout transaction types (in line with Thaussi, 2016) 
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The subject of this research is to study the impact that outsiders are able to bring into 
the target companies and therefore this paper focuses more on the outside-driven trans-
actions whit emphasis especially on MBIs and IBOs. 
 
2.3 Private equity fund structure and stakeholders 
Private equity firms can be classed as investment management companies. In Finland, 
the companies are organized as limited partnerships (Möller, Lehtimaja, Sikander & Som-
ervuori, 2013, p. 81). Figure 2 illustrates the structure and stakeholders of a PE fund. The 
representatives of the private equity firm, usually fund managers, are called General 
partner (GP). Limited partners (LPs) are the investors that provide most of the capital 
into the fund. The LPs are typically institutional investors (banks, pension funds, and in-
surance companies), funds-of-funds, family investment vehicles or other wealthy indi-




Private equity funds have typically a lifetime of ten years which can be divided into four 
phases: fundraising, target selection, investment period, and exit.  
 
Figure 2: Private equity fund structure 
18 
 
The fundraising phase usually lasts up to one year. Most PE funds are “close-ended” 
meaning that after the LPs have committed to invest in the fund they are not permitted 
to make withdraws until the end of the fund’s lifetime. At this stage, the GP also defines 
the fund’s lifespan and investment strategy which includes decisions on the growth stage 
and industries of the target companies. (EVCA, 2007; Strömberg, 2009) 
 
After raising the capital, the fund managers usually have up to five years to make the 
investments. As the investments are most often realised in three to seven years, the 
second half of the 10-year lifetime is used for follow-up investments and exits from the 
portfolio companies. The time period meant for returning capital to the investors can be 
extended up to eight years. 
 
GP makes investment decisions according to the investment strategy acknowledging the 
covenants in the fund agreement. The covenants typically draw fund level restrictions 
on how much can be invested in one company as well as on the types of financial instru-
ments, including debt, that can be utilised. (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011) 
 
Limited partners pay general partners annually a compensation called management fee, 
for managing the fund on their behalf. Management fee is the only fixed component in 
GPs cash flow.  However, usually PE firm’s revenue is mostly generated by carried interest 
which is performance-based component. The amount of received carried interest is 
based on the carry level that is defined in the fund agreement. Generally, the carry level 
is 20% meaning that after the GP earns 20 cents of each euro that is earned after com-
mitted capital is returned to LPs.  Other two fees, transaction and monitoring fees, are 
common with buyout funds but not with VC funds. (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008; Metrick 
& Yasuda, 2011) 
 
General partners’ main goal is to maximize the value of their investments. The unique 
feature of private equity investors in comparison to shareholders of quoted companies 
is that they do not only provide the funding but also are actively involved in the company 
19 
 
to increase the value. They exercise different types of shareholder activism by for exam-
ple monitoring the financial performance of the companies (cf. Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; 
Jensen, 1989). In order to support growth and entrepreneurial behaviour, PE investors 
often participate in strategic planning and decision-making through board working (cf. 
Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir, 1996; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz & Dial, 2000; Bruining, 
Verwaal & Wright, 2013). Hellman and Puri (2002) emphasise that especially in venture 
capital investments, the investors are able to add value by helping in systemising the 
internal processes and professionalising the organisation. Value-creation methods of pri-
vate equity investments are discussed more profoundly in literature review part of the 
research.  
 
At exit phase, the PE firm divests the ownership in a target company and generates re-
turns in successful trade. There are four common routes for exit: a sale to a trade buyer 
(trade sale), a sale to another PE investor (secondary buyout), management buyout or 
an initial public offering (IPO) where the company is listed on a public stock exchange. At 
this point, the fund starts returning the invested capital to the limited partners accom-
panied with possible returns. If all the committed capital is invested and the fund col-
lected a suitable amount of capital in returns from exits, general partners can start form-
ing a new fund. Evidently, the success of the previous fund impacts the popularity and 






3 Theoretical framework 
Theoretical framework in this research is formed around value creation process in pri-
vate equity investments. More specifically, the framework describes how corporate gov-
ernance, especially board work and decision making; social capital, as well as external 
and internal ties of the directors, are linked to innovation. This chapter also discusses 
these aforementioned factors’ ability to create value in the target company.   
 
3.1 Corporate governance 
A generally accepted view is that a company’s main responsibility is to create value for 
its owners. Company’s board of directors is in a key role to create strategy for implemen-
tation. Thus, although board members do not participate on the operational level in the 
company, they are in the spotlight in value creation in the company as simultaneously 
practicing good corporate governance. This chapter represents three theories for those 
practices: agency theory, hegemony theory, and entrepreneurial approach.  
 
Board of directors is, from legal perspective, presumed to control management’s actions. 
Board members are therefore legally responsible if failing to make knowledgeable deci-
sions for the firm’s best interest (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). According to mana-
gerial hegemony theory, the CEO and corporate management are supposed to influence 
the board (D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993; Kosnik, 1987; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Stiles, 2001).  
Furthermore, board members are expected to agree with top management’s decisions 
as they have been appointed and selected by the management and/or due to their lack 
of knowledge of the operations and processes in the business resulting in not wanting 
to risk the status and board compensation by disagreeing (Stevenson & Radin, 2009).  
 
One of the main concerns in finance literature and especially in research of private equity 
value creation are agency problems between the owners and the management team (cf. 
Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner & Miranda, 2011; Harris, Siegel & Wright, 2005; 
Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). Studies have found two main mechanisms to tackle these 
21 
 
problems through improved corporate governance: management incentives and active 
ownership. Paying attention to management incentives is suggested to reduce need for 
monitoring. On the other hand, reduction of monitoring costs with actions of active own-
ership can help minimizing agency costs.  
 
According to agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Young, Stedham & Beekun, 2000) 
board members can be ineffective to influence decision-making. Theory assumes the re-
lationship between the owners and the managers to be a contract between principals 
and agents. The problems emerge when management is separated from the income 
sources of ownership, and management then tries to maximize their own wealth and 
power, occasionally against the interest of the shareholders.  
 
Jensen (1986) has studied the effects of agency theory and corporate governance actions 
in private equity investments. He argues managers to have incentives to invest free cash 
flow at below the cost of capital or to spend inefficiencies. Therefore, added leverage 
may help in reduction of agency cost of free cash flow. Firstly, obligation to make debt 
payments reduces the amount of available cash for managers to waste but also it in-
creases motivation in the whole organisation to be more efficient. Secondly, limited part-
ners and creditors, of which first mentioned have a significant share of equity and latter 
need to be assured to finance new projects, monitor the company more closely when 
the level of debt is higher.  
 
Both, hegemony and agency theories consider independent, outside board members 
important in terms of resisting and reducing too opportunistic behaviour in managers 
(Frankforter, Berman & Jones, 2000; Kosnik, 1987). Hegemony theory refers to weak 
board monitoring as lack of independence of directors.  According to the hegemony the-
ory, independent directors that were not selected by the existing management, that do 
not serve, have not served in the management of the firm, nor have any business rela-
tions with the firm, should be more willing to influence the decisions than the dependent 
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directors that have a tie of a kind or other obligation or interest in the firm. Correspond-
ingly, from agency theory’s viewpoint, independent directors are seen less prone to con-
nive with managers for their own benefit. (Fama & Jensen, 1983) 
 
More recent studies discussing the relationship between corporate governance and pri-
vate equity present a concept of entrepreneurial approach. In favour of PE, the studies 
argue that “entrepreneurship should be understood not as particular empirical phenom-
enon” (e.g. self-employment, start-ups, and new-product innovation) but as a general, 
abstract function, as a way of thinking or acting” (Klein et al., 2013; Klein, 2008). This 
approach refers to Knight (1921), Casson (1982), and Foss and Klein (2012) by treating 
entrepreneurship as “judgemental decision making under uncertainty”. In this context, 
judgement is understood as making decisions which are not possible to represent using 
formal models or decision rules but are still not associated with chance or luck.  
 
Dissimilar to other entrepreneurial features like alertness (Kirzner, 1973), judgement is 
unmistakable in the ownership of productive assets. Under uncertain conditions, judge-
ment mirrors the utmost decision authority about formation and use of valuable re-
sources. In order to promote financial or other gain, entrepreneurs enact time after time 
to incorporate heterogeneous capital resources which features are personally recog-
nised. (Klein et al., 2013)  
 
Private equity firms are in various ways detected to be more entrepreneurial than pub-
licly traded firms. General Partners are said to be among the most significant entrepre-
neurs, and the members of the management team of their portfolio companies have 
more in common with entrepreneurs than with general managers (Wright et al., 2000; 
Wright, Hoskisson & Busenitz, 2001). There are arguments in favour and against whether 
PE companies are able to create innovation, start-ups and other phenomena that are 
usually linked to entrepreneurship. Empirical findings of the topic in question are dis-




3.2 Social capital 
The concept of social capital was originated in the classics of sociology already in the 
nineteenth century yet there are three sociologists that have made a significant contri-
bution to more recent development: Ronald Burt, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam. 
All three offer somewhat different definitions of social capital. Coleman (1990, p. 304) 
argued social capital to be created “when the relations among persons change in ways 
that facilitate action”. Whereas Coleman’s definition emphasises social capital as a com-
bination of relations and resources, Burt’s approach focuses on describing social capital 
as relations and networks of relations per se. He defines social capital as relationships 
with others – “friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive 
opportunities to use your financial and human capital” (Burt, 1992, p. 9). The third ap-
proach is centralized around groups instead of individuals. Putnam (1993, p. 167) de-
scribes social capital as “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and net-
works that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinating actions”. He 
also overruns Coleman’s approach by including moral resources such as trust and norms.  
 
Alternatively, Nahapiet and Ghosal’s (1998) approach combines individuals and groups. 
Despite the concept being abstract in nature, they suggest social capital to be considered 
as a property of an individual or a group that enables them to attain something that is 
otherwise inaccessible to them. Ronald Burt has later deepened his earlier view into a 
straightforward notion that refers people with wider network to be more successful than 
others. He characterizes social capital being “the contextual complement to human cap-
ital”, in which “the social capital metaphor is that the people who do better are somehow 
better connected” (Burt, 2000).   
 
Business research typically observe social capital in the organization by examining the 
quantity or the quality of the ties. Baker (1990) refers to social capital as the number of 
formal and informal connections inside an organisation. The more connections a firm 
has, the more social capital it possesses, and as a result transfer as a greater advantage 
for a company. A research focusing on the other line of study, the quality of the ties, 
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presents an explanation of inter-firm performance differences with the strength of the 
relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). According to the same study, the reason for 
the differences lies behind the relational aspects of social interactions, and thus amongst 
companies in which the ties are stronger seize greater trust, cooperation and legitimacy. 
Although both findings received praise among the academics, some have suggested so-
cial capital and its advantages to not purely arise from one or the other, but instead from 
the combination of quantity and quality of the connections in the firm’s network (cf. 
Arenius, 2002).  
 
3.2.1 Social capital as network 
In a frequently cited study, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) describe a framework that ex-
plains how social capital may promote value creation in corporations. Their framework 
identifies three dimensions of social capital: structural, relational, and cognitive. The 
structural dimension aligns significantly with how network is represented in the net-
working theory as it illustrates the way detached links and their configurations connect 
one actor to another. In other words, it includes the ties within a social network and the 
location of an actor’s connections inside the social structure of interaction. Structural 
dimension can be defined using measures like density, hierarchy, and connectivity. (Na-
hapiet & Ghoshal, 1998)  
 
Relational dimension, on the other hand, focuses particularly on the quality of the ties 
an actor has, emphasising those which might influence one’s behaviour (Weber & Weber, 
2007). People accept the agreed rules and cooperate and act in the common interest 
through the personal connections they have. Hence relational dimension essentially 
acknowledges in each individual relationship the traits, such as trust, respect, and friend-
ships that affect the norms, obligations and conduct of actors (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, 
p. 243).  
 
Cognitive dimension “refers to those resources providing shared representations, inter-
pretations, and systems of meaning among parties” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, p. 244). 
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Arenius (2002, p. 55) argues that the cognitive properties enable “the common under-
standing of collective goals and of proper ways to interact with one another.” 
 
Another approach on theories of social capital focuses on networks between individuals. 
Researchers have identified two different network structures, dense and sparse net-
works, and recently have started a debate over the beneficial effects of the two. Coleman 
(1988) argues that members of a dense network trust each other to respect obligations 
which as a result, decreases the uncertainty of exchanges as well as increases the ability 
to cooperate in the inquiry of interests. The amount of available social capital for an actor 
is then possible to derive from the closure of the network around him or her. Granovetter 
(1985) has similar observations but in different form as he argues common third parties 
having a positive impact in promoting trust between actors and reducing the risk of op-
portunism which could influence cooperative relationships.  
 
Alguezaui and Filieri (2010) derive their definition for the density of a network from Cole-
man’s (1988) argument referring to it as the degree of tie redundancy and interrelation 
between the members in the firm. In other words, a network is cohesive when all actors 
in the network are linked to each other.  
 
On the contrary, Granovetter argued as early as in 1973 in favour of the strength of weak 
ties providing the base for the advocates of brokerage1. Burt (1992) further developed 
the concept highlighting the benefits of sparse network configurations. As a result, 
emerged the structural network theory from which is derived the definition for sparse 
network. Instead of emphasising “the utility of consistent norms fostered by cohesive 
networks”, the sparse network theory declares the benefits of social capital to be a result 
of diversity of information and brokerage opportunities which emerge from absence of 
link between separate bundles in a social configuration.  
 
 
1 Brokerage is, at its simplest, defined as a process that links otherwise unconnected actors and a broker 
as an intermediary who act as a link between these two actors (Stovel & Shaw, 2012).  
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On the track of Portes (1998), Stevenson and Radin (2009) question the definitions that 
combine social relations and potential causes and outcomes such as norms of trust and 
social obligation. They argue such definitions lead to causal circularity. Firstly, they ques-
tion whether social capital is therefore a characteristic of civic engagement or a way to 
develop civic engagement in a society. Secondly, they suspect is trust “as a component 
of social capital necessary for participation in civic affairs or an outcome of civic partici-
pation.” 
 
Portes (1998) argues that it is inevitable to distinguish who has social capital, the sources 
of social capital, and the resources created by social capital in order to avoid tautological 
definitions and causal circularity. Several researchers have further developed and nar-
rowed the concept to consider only social relations and the outcomes of the relations in 
question.  
 
Separation degrees and lengths of paths are frequently used terms in social network 
theory. They can be measured as a number of contacted intermediaries in order to pass 
a message from one person to another in a network (Nicholson, Alexander and Kiel, 
2004). Figure 3 presents interlocks between companies and how they become a network 
through connected board members. This figure presents links between four companies 
that all have four board members. Part A shows a typical intercorporate network where 
each board represents a participating company linking all the whole board to two other 
companies in the network.  
 
Part B represents the same situation as Part A with exception of showing the number of 
participating individuals. Solid lines illustrate links inside the board whereas dashed lines 
connect two separate boards through a shared director that has two positions. Part C 
then illustrates the real degree of separation of board interlocks. This is a simplified rep-
resentation where an individual can hold maximum of two directorships and only one of 
the board members in the company can be in that situation. In real life, and what is the 
situation with the data of this research, that the networks are significantly more complex 
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and wider as the number of board members can be larger and several directors of one 
board may have multiple positions in other boards.  
 
Linkages between board members are particularly important in terms of private equity 
investments as the new owners often either replace and/or bring new directors on the 










When social capital is only seen as a network of ties between individuals, it allows to 
make a distinction between the creation of ties and the outcomes, e.g. trust. Kramer and 
Cook (2004) highlight that a bond between two actors can lead to consensus and joint 
outcomes but not certainly to trust. Board members usually share a mutual interest to 
cooperate to solve problems as they all benefit as investors but that does not necessarily 
result in trust amongst board members (Stevenson & Radin, 2009).  
 
Innovations are seen as an output of cooperation and uninterrupted interaction be-
tween the company and external parties. Company’s competitiveness is based on inno-
vation whose basis is on socially embedded learning processes but is limited by the econ-
omy-wide ability to learn. That is, why firms today depend on their external networks 
which have a vital role in creating, developing, and exploiting new opportunities to cre-
ate added value. Hence, social capital caters the company the tools to connect with dis-
tinctive resources and a configuration of relationships, consequently enhancing the com-






4 Prior empirical results 
As previously mentioned, private equity, innovation and board interlocks have not pre-
viously been studied together. Therefore, this chapter starts by discussing objectives of 
private equity investments in general. Each of the subchapters discusses two of the focus 
areas of this thesis, either private equity, board working and corporate governance, or 
innovation. First two are discussed in the first subchapters. Following two subchapters 
are dedicated for innovation as first shows results of relation to private equity and sec-
ond to social capital. The chapter finishes by evaluation of a created synthesis to support 
composition of hypotheses.  
 
The academics have debated for decades over superiority of PE firms’ investments and 
the incentive creation tools they use on their portfolio companies. In general, studies 
focusing on the first wave of PE-backed investments in the 1980 reflect mostly positive 
results in target firm performance explained by the superiority of private equity govern-
ance. More recent findings on the other hand are somewhat more critical and cautious. 
Although most of the literature investigating private equity investments find support for 
private equity investors’ targets to outperform their peers, overall there is no strong ev-
idence in terms of buyouts (Wilson, Wright, Siegel & Scholes, 2012).  
 
In the centre is the investment horizon, whether PE firms intend to generate value on 
short- or long-term. Those in favour of superiority of LBO governance structure argue it 
to enable incentives for managers to create value by cutting unprofitable unrestricted 
expenses and seeking profit-making opportunities for growth (Boucly, Sraer & Thesmar, 
2011; Jensen, 1986; Wright et al, 2001). For a contrary, the detractors argue PE firms to 
have a short-term investment horizon which endorses to aim for short-term returns 
while simultaneously the high leverage deflects cash from long-term placements in the 




Amess, Stiebale and Wright (2016) suggest innovation to be the solution as it creates 
long-term returns through long-term investments. However, there are also other pro-
posals. Jensen (1989) show two possibilities how buyouts create economic efficiencies 
through superior corporate governance practiced by the GPs in evening managers’ in-
centives. Then there is the question whether the GPs are able to bring anything else to 
the board than control and discipline or not. This chapter presents possible solutions for 
those dilemmas through results of academic literature on the focal topics.  
 
4.1 Evidence on value creation through corporate governance 
Agency problems are widely debated topic in companies but also in the corporate gov-
ernance literature. It is proposed that monitoring and controlling through practices of 
active ownership are effective tools to reduce those problems as managers have a fre-
quent mandate to report to the board and there is a mutual understanding that they are 
easily replaceable if targets are not achieved (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007). Simultane-
ously, while agency problems are reduced, the opportunities for value creation increase.  
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) present three types of actions on how private equity firms 
create value: financial engineering, operational engineering and governance engineering. 
Financial engineering focuses mainly on incentives and motivation of the management 
team. Governance engineering is linked to actions that the private equity firm takes to 
control the board of directors of the target company. Generally, the boards of companies 
belonging to a private equity family, are smaller in size but more active than those of 
comparable public companies. PE firms usually allocate board seats by taking three for 
themselves, giving one or two for representative(s) of management and one or two for 
outsiders (Gompers, Kaplan & Mukharlyamov, 2016).   
 
Braun and Latham (2009) imply that board structure could act as a predictor for financial 
performance. Results in their research show that increase in board size post-transaction 
is positively correlated with increased operational performance. For a contrary, if the 
board size is decreased, it can be associated with negative changes in the performance. 
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As a conclusion, the authors suggest that changes in board structure is one of the possi-
ble tools for value creation in LBOs to improve the operational performance.  
Through operational engineering, PE firms involve the industry and operating expertise 
while creating added value to the target company (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). In prac-
tice, they hire industry professionals with operative expertise from focal industry along-
side the transaction specialists. In addition, there might also be other external consult-
ants and advisors involved in the process. While operating partners, the PE team mem-
bers, identify post-investment sources for value creation, external consultant’s role is 
most significant in conducting a pre-investment commercial due diligence (Gompers et 
al., 2016). Although PE firms tend to stay out of the operational level functions in the 
portfolio company, as part of value creation process they are often part of value creation 
process through involvement in reform of strategy and/or business model and engaging 
in the implementation through operational engineering by changing the management 
team members such as the CEO and CFO (Gompers et al., 2016).  
 
In fact, within 100 days after the investment, 39 % of the CEOs in the portfolio companies 
are replaced and 69 % at some point during the investment period (Acharya, Gottschalg, 
Hahn & Kehoe, 2013). Consistent with last finding, Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2011) find 
the CEO replacement rate of 37 % while pointing out that improvements are greater if 
the CEO is replaced at the time of the investment.  Moreover, Acharya et al. (2013) report 
general partners with operational background to generate higher returns in organic 
deals whereas GPs with financial background outperform in inorganic deals2. 
 
4.2  Private equity and innovation 
Most studies on relationship between private equity and innovation are focused on VC 
backed deals. That is understandable as usually innovation is connected to young com-
panies operating in technology sectors that are the more appealing targets for venture 
 
2 Term organic deal refers to a deal without major M&A activities i.e. value creation is focused more on 
operational improvements (Acharya et al., 2013)  
33 
 
capitalists than for private equity funds. These studies, however, have differing findings 
on innovativeness.  
 
The earlier studies on firms’ innovativeness have conducted the empirical analysis by 
examining R&D expenditures (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). 
That is, however, a questionable measure as it is impossible to make a distinction be-
tween productive and unproductive expenditures (Amess, et al., 2016). Nonetheless, 
Zahra (1995) suggests that PE firms are able to improve product development and com-
mercialise the technologies of the PCs through more effective usage of R&D expendi-
tures in MBOs. This finding confirms PE funds to be able to serve superior managerial 
and technical expertise that provides the target companies to conquer new markets and 
possibilities for innovation. The effect is explained to be a result of providing incentives 
to embrace entrepreneurial practicalities and strategies for innovation in order to make 
better use of the investments in R&D (Bruining et al, 2013; Link, Ruhm & Siegel, 2014).  
 
There are a handful of other studies that tend to find differing results whether private 
equity investors are able to increase level of innovation in the target companies. A study 
from Kortum and Lerner (2000) is one of the most cited papers aiming to explain the 
impact private equity investors have on innovation in their portfolio companies. They 
examine issued patents in the US between years 1965 and 1992 and find increased ven-
ture capital activity to have a significant positive effect to the number of issued patents. 
They also imply that venture capitalists would explain some 8% of the total industrial 
innovation in the US in 1983-1992.  
 
For a contrary, Popov and Roosenboom (2012) report findings from European VC funds 
that have not been able to spur innovation as strongly as their American rivals. They 
analyse VC investments from 21 European countries in 1991-2005. After comparing the 
results to Kortum and Lerner (2000), they demonstrate European VC funds to have had 
a mostly positive impact on patenting activity but simultaneously they question the sig-
nificance of the result as the results vary remarkably between different countries. They 
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explain the VC effect on innovation to be greater in countries which have low barriers 
for entrepreneurship and venturing as well as convenient regulatory and tax environ-
ment for VC funds.  
 
Engel and Keilbach (2007) have an alternative argument as they suggest positive results 
to be an outcome of selecting companies that are innovative in lieu of venture capitalists 
facilitating innovation. They study companies that have received funding from German 
VC funds, compare them to peers which have not received similar funding and examine 
patent applications of both groups. They report VC backed companies to be more inno-
vative than their peers, but the focal companies were more innovative already before 
the investments were made. In other words, results indicate that instead of increasing 
innovation, the investors commercialise the innovations of their portfolio companies. 
Engel and Keilbach’s results support the findings of Hellmann and Puri (2000) which in-
dicate innovative firms to have higher potential to become targets for VC investors. 
 
Lerner, Sørensen and Strömberg (2011) argue that portfolio companies’ patenting activ-
ity does not change after initial investment but instead the citation frequency of the focal 
companies increases. However, they were not able to clarify whether the greater eco-
nomic impact, which is derives from producing research, is a result of selection or causal 
effect.  
 
As discussed earlier, the academics debate whether private equity investors aim to cre-
ate value either on long- or short-term. Amess et al. (2016) contribute on the debate and 
in the end show that empirical analysis of innovation activity is competent in solving this 
controversy as investments in innovation usually require making placements that create 
returns for longer-term. They find that PE-backed LBOs to have a positive casual effect 
on patenting as well as quality-adjusted-patents in terms of number of citations. More-
over, they report evidence that suggest PE firms to be able to relax financial restrictions 
in their portfolio companies and consequently enable greater innovation activity. Thirdly, 
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they show that LBOs impact particularly contemporary patenting instead of strategic pa-
tenting and the effect is mostly driven by private-to-private transactions in industries 
that are financially dependent. Finding is in line with Morgan and Abetti (2004) that ar-
gue high-tech firms to be so risky that VC and PE investors are the only option to receive 
financing from.  
 
Most of the studies on the value creation and impact of private equity firms consider the 
funds to be homogenous. Ughetto (2010) however notes that there might actually be 
several fund-level characteristics that impact the patent activity of the target companies. 
In other words, PE firm’s size, geographical location and stage specialisation as well as 
other deal characteristics, such as invested amount and the number of investors, corre-
late with the patent activity. Nonetheless, the sample lacks firms that are not PE-backed 
which creates a certain limitation for full interpretation whether LBOs that are PE-backed 
steer automatically to higher level of patenting activity or not.  
 
4.3 Social capital and innovation 
Theoretical framework established two perspectives to study social capital and linkages 
between individuals, including board members: quality and quantity of the ties. Several 
studies find a greater number of board members to have a positive impact on the firm’s 
performance as more people have access to wider set of external resources (Pfeffer, 
1972; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978) and competences (Zahra et al., 2000). Golden and Zajac 
(2001), however, point out that as number of directors increases, it may lead to other 
detriments, such as free-riding and emergency of factions. Furthermore, larger number 
of directors is found to be associated with higher conflict risk between the board mem-
bers (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). All these aspects affect negatively the decision-making, 
and consequently strategy formation and innovation, in the firm. However, there is only 
a weak evidence to support that conclusion (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009).  
 
Previous studies of the relationship between social capital and innovation have empha-
sised the role of external actors and the social interactions with these actors to be drivers 
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for higher level of innovation in a company. Landry, Amara and Lamari (2002) show that 
increased level of social capital (participation assets and relational assets) increases in-
novation in a firm more than any other independent variable in their analysis. This find-
ing is associated with the effect where social capital takes a form of research network 
asset.   
 
The founders of new ventures do not build their consecutive network of ties as they also 
bring their personal and prior connections with them to their latest establishments (Hite 
& Hesterley, 2001). These interpersonal ties are vital in company’s early stages, but the 
social capital of the founders becomes more insufficient in providing the added re-
sources for further development and expansion of the business (Arenius, 2002).  
 
Ahuja (2000) presents how benefits of social network in a framework of R&D alliances 
enhances company’s abilities for innovation. He examines social capital by comparing 
direct and indirect ties and finds social capital to have a positive impact on the number 
R&D alliances. These alliances generate three advantages: knowledge sharing and com-
plementary competences among partners as well as economies of scale in R&D pro-
grams. Another discovery in his study is related to the relationship of direct and indirect 
ties. He finds that the impact of indirect ties on innovation is mitigated by the number 
of direct ties.   
 
Several studies find social interactions affecting firm’s innovation activity positively, yet 
it has stayed inconclusive what kind of network structure is optimal for supporting and 
increasing innovation performance. The academic also debates over the opportunities 
and threats of different social configurations, especially cohesive and sparse networks, 
on innovations in a firm.  (Ahuja, 2000; Brass, 2003; Burt, 2004; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005; Flem-
ing, Mingo & Chen, 2007).  
 
Most of the studies on board working are focused on the board characteristics and their 
impact on firm performance. Based on findings cited in previous sections, it is clear that 
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the board has an essential role not only in terms of firm value and performance but also 
in terms of innovation and value creation. The board members are important partici-
pants in operations as advisors and in their monitoring role. However, the board mem-
bers level of engagement is found to be significantly correlated with aforementioned 
attributes. Whether the impact is positive or negative is inconclusive and dependent on 
the applied theory (Zona, Gomez-Mejia & Withers, 2018).   
 
4.4 Synthesis 
Concerning the studies discussed in this chapter, it is clear that previous researches are 
relatively tightly narrowed. The previous results focus on either VC backed or BO backed 
and even in terms of buyouts the focus is often solely on LBOs or MBOs. However, this 
paper is aiming to explain differences between the transaction types by distinguishing 
the two general concepts, BO and VC, in the empirical part of the research.  
 
Furthermore, the amount of recent studies and even post-financial crisis are limited. One 
explanation could be that the outcomes of the transactions need to be observed for sev-
eral years after the transaction which limits the possible time period farther in the his-
tory.  
 
Regardless of the limitations and drawbacks, it is possible to make deductions to support 
the hypotheses introduced as a part of introduction. In terms of corporate governance, 
changes made at the time of investment makes improvements greater. Hence it could 
be expected corporate governance actions to have a positive impact on innovation and 
financial performance of the company.  
 
As a recap from previous empirical results it is evident that the impact of changes inves-
tors make in the company is the greatest when commenced right in the beginning of the 
investment period. Instead of initiating and spurring innovation, especially the VC inves-
tors aim to commercialise the developed innovations. Yet at the same time, previous 
38 
 
results argue that increase in social capital would also increase innovation and the role 





5 Data and methodology 
5.1 Data 
5.1.1 Data collection 
The data sample comprises of private equity and venture capital deals from year 2010 
to 2015. The set including target company names, transaction types and information on 
acquirer(s) was received from the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA). Deals be-
tween years 2010 and 2012 are self-reported to FVCA by its member firms. Next three 
years, 2013 to 2015, are collected from public media sources.  
 
Sample includes deals where either the target company or the investing fund is Finnish. 
The total deal count between years 2010 and 2015 is 491. However, since the focus is on 
Finnish companies, transactions made by a Finnish fund in foreign companies were ex-
tracted after which the sample contains 473 transactions. After excluding transactions 
that were double in the original sample and companies for which none of the financial 
figures were found the complete sample comprise 401 deals. Since several companies 
have completed multiple funding rounds, the sample comprises 340 individual firms.  
 
In order to avoid survivorship bias, the sample comprises each company that has re-
ceived private equity funding within chosen timeframe. That means also companies that 
have defaulted or otherwise ceased after receiving the investment are included in the 
sample if the financials are available until default.  
 
Data was collected for each company in the sample for the investment year “year 0” and 
three subsequent fiscal years; “year 1”, “year 2”, and “year 3”. This time period is chosen 
as it is frequently used window in prior academic studies concerning private equity in-
vestments (see e.g. Amess et al., 2016; Lerner et al., 2011; Tykvová & Borell, 2012). Ale-
many and Marti (2005) find out that private equity investors’ average holding period is 
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around three years. Moreover, Cressy, Munari and Malipiero (2007) present that the op-
erating profitability of the buyout target companies increase significantly over the first 
three years after the investment. These findings support the application of the three-
year observation period in this research.  
 
Accounting information and firm attribute data (such as NACE industry codes 3  and 
unique numerical identification codes) for target companies were retrieved using Valu8 
platform which aggregates private company information in European countries. As data 
set received from FVCA includes only company names, the first batch of data from Valu8 
had a notable amount of missing values. This situation occurs if the company has 
changed name or it has been merged to another company. Problem was solved by check-
ing one by one the unique business identification numbers for each company from other 
public sources and databases provided by Suomen Asiakastieto, Finder.fi, Duunitori and 
ytunnus.fi.  
 
Data on patents and patent citations were derived from Orbis database provided by Bu-
reau van Dijk (BvD). Information was matched using BvD identification numbers for each 
company.  
 
Data collection procedure faced some problems in terms of the quality. The method 
avoids the selection bias as the data is completely collected from external databases 
which are not based on questionnaire answers or information disclosed on voluntary 
bases. Although each company in Finland is mandated to report financial information to 
the Finnish Patent and Registration Office, that is also the source of Valu8, in total 22 % 
of the data points were missing when the data was retrieved utilising the application 
programming interface (API). Most of the missing values were filled manually, utilising 
scanned original financial statement documents provided on Valu8 or financial state-
ment information on Orbis database. Also, Orbis receives the financial information from 
 
3 Table 16 in Appendix 1 contains the list of classifications and the distribution of the sample by industry.  
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the Finnish Patent and Registration Office, so the credibility and comparability of the 
data remains. 
 
In case where one of a few values is missing from financial information, the values were 
estimated according to Table 1. In the end, only 20 out of 12832 data points were inter-
polated. The estimation of number of employees make an exception to methods de-
scribed in the table. If a company was not in bankrupt (produces sales and total assets 
are larger than zero), number of employees receive a value of 1 instead of zero when the 
first value is missing. Estimation was based on assumption that the company must have 
at least one employee running the operations.  
 
Table 1. Estimation of Missing Data Values 
This table presents the procedure for estimation of missing values. The purpose is to generate estimates for missing 
values in order to increase the growth rates of estimated measures in the final analysis. Estimation was done ac-
cording to type of the missing value and to the type of the company. Estimation was done only in case it was possi-
ble to estimate with high reliability; otherwise the company were excluded from the final sample.  
Type of missing value Estimation procedure 
First value missing First value is considered as zero 
Missing value is between two existing values Missing value is linearly interpolated 
Missing value is the last value for an active company Missing value is the last reported value 
Missing value is the last value for an inactive company Missing value is zero 
 
 
Final challenge to overcome in collecting comparable sample was linked to differing fiscal 
years between the companies. In other words, all the companies do not report on cal-
endar year basis and therefore fiscal years need to be matched. The problem was solved 
by matching the fiscal year to the closest calendar year. For example, if a company’s fiscal 
year starts on the 1st of April and ends the 31st of March, it is considered to match the 
fiscal year starting in January in the same year. In some cases, the duration of a fiscal 
year is irregular i.e. when a company is established in October the first fiscal year could 
be extended to last more than 12 months, until the end of next calendar year. Then the 




The purpose of this research is to study the impact of private equity investors on the 
target firms’ performance and innovation. The variables used in the empirical analysis 
are chosen to represent as accurately as possible the different factors affecting the ob-
jects under the scope. Several other variables were tested, and Table 2 presents those 
variables that were chosen and are included in the study. The table also provides  
the abbreviation for each variable that is utilised later in representation of the regression 
equations and description of each variable and its type of value.  
 
Table 2. Description of variables used in empirical analysis 
This table presents the different variables that are used in the empirical analysis of this research.  
Variables are presented by their type in accordance to their role in the regression analysis. Also,  
abbreviation and more detailed description of each variable is included. All the financial figures are in 
Euros. 
Variable Sign Description 
Dependent variables   
Sales S 
Natural logarithm of total sales in a given 
year 
Patent application PATA = 1 if applied for patent, 0 else 
Explanatory variables   
Board size BS 
Average number of board members in a 
given year4 
New linkages NL 
Natural logarithm of number of linkages 
brought in by new board members in a 
given year 
Chair’s linkages CML 
Natural logarithm of total number of link-
ages the chair of the board has 
Other member’s linkages OML 
Natural logarithm of total number of link-
ages the other member(s) than the chair 
has/have 
CEO change CEOC = 1 if CEO changed, else 0 
Chair change CMC = 1 if Chair changed, else 0 
CEO’s directorship CEOM = 1 if CEO is board member, else 0 
Employees E 
Natural logarithm of total number of em-
ployees 
Total assets TA 
Natural logarithm of total book value of 
assets 
Asset turnover AT Sales / Total assets 
 
4 Complete formula presented on the page 44 
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Intangible assets IA 
Natural logarithm of total book value of in-
tangible assets 
Firm age FAGE 
Natural logarithm of firm age in years in a 
given year 
EBITDA-% EM EBITDA-margin 
High-tech industry HT = 1 if high-tech firm, else 0 
New patents NG 
Natural logarithm of number of filed pa-
tent applications that have later been 
granted 
Patent stock PS 
Natural logarithm of depreciated sum of 
patent applications 
Patents a priori PREPAT 
= 1 if company had patent application 
prior to the investment 
 
Previous studies utilise three different measures to proxy innovation: patents, intangible 
assets and research and development expenditure (R&D) (see e.g. Alemany & Martí, 
2005; Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Lerner et al., 2011). This research uses the first two men-
tioned as availability of data on R&D expenditure is limited. Utilising two different allows 
to measure the fit for the purpose.  
 
Intangible assets (IA) are logarithmic absolute values measured for each year. Patents on 
the other hand are observed from different angles. There are two continuous variables 
and two categorical. New patents (NG) is the total number of filed new patent applica-
tions5 during given year that have been eventually granted. The actual date when patent 
applications are granted, is not available and therefore also the granted patents are ap-
plied by the application year since in reality the length of the granting process may differ 
significantly according to two reasons. The length of the granting process depends on 
the characteristics of the invention the patent is applied for and on the country where 
the application is filed in. However, that way the delays in the process are controlled 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Trajtenberg, 1990; Ughetto, 2010).  
 
In addition to the continuous variables the regression analysis utilises two dummy vari-
ables of patents. Patent application (PATA) receives a value of 1 if a firm has filed a new 
 
5 An application is counted as individual application although it could be related to same innovation or 
finding as another application. In other words, similar applications are counted separately if applied, for 
example, in another country. 
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patent application in a given year and the patent has been granted later. For the second 
categorical variable is given a value of 1 if a firm had filed a patent application already 
before receiving funding. Patents a priori (PREPAT) thus provides the possibility to meas-
ure the impact of pre-investment patents have during the years after receiving the fund-
ing. Patent stock (PS) following Blundell, Griffith and Windmeijer (1995), is calculated as 
the sum of total past patents and depreciated with 15 % depreciation rate. Also, other 
previous studies use similar measure for patent activity (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ughetto, 
2010).  
 
Board size (BS) represents the average number of board members in a given year. It is 
calculated followingly 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 =  




The three different variables of linkages are proxies for the social connections of the di-
rectors that they have through their external board seats in a given year. The structure 
of the linkages is presented in figure 3 in sub-chapter 3.2.1. The variable counts all the 
other board members the person has shared a board with and the CEO of the company.  
Comparing results of the chair’s linkages (CML) and the other board members’ linkages 
(OML) provides information on whose connections are more relevant. Important aspect 
here is that the data of the linkages includes only connections in Finland as the matching 
has been based on unique ID number that has not been possible to create for individuals 
that do not have a Finnish identification number. 
 
As previously explained, the purpose of the research is to also study the impact the new 
board members and their connections have on the firm performance and innovation. 
That measure is proxied by ‘new linkages’ (NL) which represents the total number of 




Alongside the continuous variables there are four other categorical variables. Previous 
studies show that 69% of CEOs are changed within sometime during the investment pe-
riod (Acharya et al., 2013). However, chairman changes have not been studied before in 
this field of research. In order to observe the impact, the new leaders might have in the 
target company this research uses two different variables. CEO change (CEOC) receives 
value of 1 if the CEO of the firm has changed in a given year. Chair change (CMC) behaves 
similarly replacing the CEO with the Chair. CEOM proxies for the CEO’s directorship an 
receives value of 1 if the CEO is also a board member. 
 
Asset turnover, sales-to-assets, proxies for firm efficiency. It is calculated by dividing total 
sales with total assets and represents how well the firm utilises the assets. Other finan-
cial figures include sales and total assets. In addition, two different profit measures are 
included in the models: EBITDA-margin and net profit margin. EBITDA is often used as a 
proxy for free cash flow and is thus able to represent operational changes completed in 
the company (Acharya et al. 2013; Achleitner et al. 2011; Guo et al. 2011). Following 
items are presented are winsorized at 1 % and 99 % level in order to remove the effect 
of outliers: total assets, intangible assets, sales, and EBITDA-margin. The first three items 
are transformed to logarithmic scale after winsorizing. 
 
5.1.3 Descriptive statistics 
The purpose of descriptive statistics is to provide insight in the data sample. Descriptive 
statistics are observed from four different perspectives. First part conducts the whole 
data sample. The second part inspects a subsample comprising firms that are included 
in the 75th percentile according to total number of linkages the board members have in 
order to examine the characteristics of companies that have wide social network. An-
other comparison to the whole sample is made by inspecting subsample of companies 
that have filed a patent application already before receiving the funding. Finally, a year-
by-year analysis highlights the key differences between firms according to the invest-




Figure 4 shows the distribution of the 401 transactions in the data sample divided by the 
investment year and investment type. To mark the main points, the increase in number 
of transactions throughout the years is evident. Especially the number of venture capital 
transactions has surged, from 36 in 2010 to 114 in 2015 with cumulative average growth 
rate of 26.0 %. The 49 transactions in total in 2010 account for only 12.2 % of the total 
sample whereas the 142 transactions in 2015 take a share of 35.4 %. However, the lowest 
point in the sample appear to be the year 2012.  
 
 
Figure 4: Data sample division by investment year and investment type 
 
 
Table 3 shows that 24 % of firms included in the sample have received buyout funding 
and accordingly, 76 % of the firms venture capital funding. The age of the firms ranges 
from 0 to 75 yet an average firm is almost eight years old and has around 71 employees. 
The average sales of a firm are around 15 million euros and total assets some 21 million 
euros. It is evident that most of the firms are in their early years and still growing as the 
mean EBITDA-margin is negative,  
-3.50 %  
 

















The average number of board members is 3.65. Although previous studies have concen-
trated on the CEO changes, the changes of the Chairs are actually more common as dur-
ing the whole observed time window, CEO is changed on average in 13 % and the chair 
in 22 % of the deals. A closer look to these changes and comparison to previous studies 
is made as part of the year-by-year analysis while comparing the different investment 
types.  
 
When looking at the number of linkages, it is evident that the board members are often 
well connected. The chairs have on average around 38 linkages through other board 
seats and other board members 74 in total. Moreover, a new board member increases 
the social capital of the firm on average by 18 linkages when joining the board.  
 
A prior to completing a deal, a target firm has filed an eventually granted patent appli-
cation in 28 % of the total cases. The average value of the patent stock is 1.52 and an 
average firm files 0.23 patent applications over the observed four-year period. Concern-
ing that the firms included in the sample are distributed across 53 different sectors, 48 % 
operate in high-tech sectors. The share is very high as the share of high-tech exports 
from total exports in Finland was still only 17.6 % in 2008 (Statistics Finland, 2009). That 
could mean that there lies a selection bias and that private equity investors seek for 




Table 3. Whole sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Investment type 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Age 7.70 8.54 0.00 75.00 
log(age) 1.83 0.80 0.00 4.33 
Employees 71.02 250.65 0.00 3420.00 
log(employees) 2.67 1.60 0.00 8.14 
Sales 14857049 54204074 0.00 420278522 
log(Sales) 11.74 5.59 0.00 19.86 
Total assets 13745445 41077740 0.00 292478650 
log(total assets) 13.84 3.99 0.00 19.49 
Intangible assets 2087404 5567947 0.00 34074840 
log(intangible assets) 10.64 5.53 0.00 17.34 
EBITDA-% -3.50 13.70 -98.40 1.06 
Board size 3.65 1.44 0.00 9.50 
CEO change 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 37.61 43.18 0.00 275.00 
log(chair linkages) 2.65 1.74 0.00 5.62 
Other linkages 74.49 70.70 0.00 401.00 
log(other linkages) 3.58 1.58 0.00 6.00 
New linkages 18.29 37.95 0.00 273.00 
log(new linkages) 1.20 1.79 0.00 5.61 
Patents a priori 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.52 4.41 0.00 58.68 
log(patent stock) 0.44 0.79 0.00 4.09 
New patents 0.23 1.00 0.00 15.00 
log(new patents) 0.10 0.35 0.00 2.77 
High Tech 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for firms that are well-connected. That means the 
firms are included in the 75th percentile when distributed according to total number of 
linkages the board members have. That counts firms whose directors have in total 166 
or more linkages.  
 
It appears that well-connected firms generate close to double in sales than an average 
firm in the whole sample. More than 15 million euros per fiscal year to be exact. Chairs 
and new board members of well-connected firms have on average more than double the 
amount of connections in comparison to the whole sample. The difference is even bigger 
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in terms of other board members as the mean equals around 163.09 in comparison to 
74.49 in the whole sample.  
 
The table shows that well-connected firms operate more often in other than high-tech 
sector as the share of deals completed in high-tech sectors is 11 percentage points lower 
in comparison to the whole sample. Nevertheless, the share of firms with prior patents 
does not differ from the whole sample, but the average patent stock is higher, 1.81. How-
ever, these firms file less new eventually granted patent applications the mean being 
only 0.18. That implies that well-connected firms are more mature and possibly beyond 
the product development phase already.  
 
Table 4. Well-connected firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for subsample of well-connected firms. The firms included in 
this sample are in the 75th percentile when measured by the total number of linkages the board mem-
bers have. 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Sales 29712980 75682880 0.00 420278522 
Board size 4.51 1.18 0.00 9.50 
CEO change 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 77.93 51.94 0.00 275.00 
Other linkages 163.09 68.70 7.00 401.00 
New linkages 33.87 55.83 0.00 273.00 
Patents a priori 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.81 4.81 0.00 47.65 
New patents 0.18 0.79 0.00 8.00 
High-tech 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Observations 402 402 402 402 
 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of deals with target companies that have history of 
innovation prior to receiving private equity funding. The average sales of these firms are 
around 8 million more than for an average firm in the whole sample. There are two pos-
sible explanation: 1) the firms are more mature and farther in growth stages than an 
average firm in the sample, or 2) innovation increases firm performance in terms of sales.  
Size of the board is somewhat similar with an average of four directors in comparison to 
3.65 in the whole sample. Furthermore, the CEO and the chair are replaced with similar 
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frequency, as 15 % of the CEOs are replaced and 23 % of the chairs. However, the CEOs 
hold less frequently a dual position as the CEO and a board member. Only 36 % of the 
CEOs hold a directorship as the same figure is 43 % with the whole sample.  
 
In terms of social capital, innovative firms are more connected than a target firm on av-
erage. Their chairs have on average four more linkages and other board members 10 
more linkages in total in comparison to the whole sample. However, new board members 
do not bring significantly more linkages as the difference to the whole sample is only one 
person. That could imply that higher level of social capital is correlated with higher inno-
vation intensity. 
 
Somewhat surprising is that the share of the high-tech firms is only two percentage 
points higher than in the whole sample equalling 50 % of the subsample. That could 
imply that high tech firms are not remarkably more innovative than firms operating in 
other sectors. Another possible explanation could be that since innovation is measured 
only in terms of patents, firms operating in high tech sectors do not prefer patenting as 
valuable protection for intellectual property.  
 
Table 5. Pre-investment innovation 
This table presents descriptive statistics for subsample of firms with prior innovative activities. The 
firms included in the sample have filed a patent application already before receiving PE funding.  
 Mean SD Min Max 
Sales 22726736 78362044 0.00 420278522 
Board size 4.00 1.25 1.00 7.00 
CEO change 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 41.01 44.58 0.00 210.00 
Other linkages 85.53 67.91 0.00 341.00 
New linkages 19.40 37.06 0.00 222.00 
Patent stock 5.27 7.06 0.03 58.68 
New patents 0.74 1.75 0.00 15.00 
High-tech 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Observations 448 448 448 448 
 
Tables 17 to 24 in appendices 2 and 3 show a more detailed description of buyout and 
venture capital target companies and comparison between these two investment types’ 
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scopes. The variables presented in these tables are limited to proxies for corporate gov-
ernance, social capital and innovation.  
 
On the corporate governance side, the post-transaction changes are stronger in terms of 
buyouts. 20 % of the BO targets’ CEOs are replaced during the investment year, the rate 
decreases to 11 % in year 1 but increases again to 14 % and 16 % during years 2 and 3, 
respectively. In venture capital investments changes are milder as the highest value, 15 % 
occur in year 0 and has the low point in year 3 at 9 %. As previously mentioned, chair 
changes are less studied than CEO replacements. The average rate is significantly higher 
in BO transactions in comparison to the whole sample as 48 % of the firm’s that have 
received funding from a buyout fund replace the chair during the year of investment. 
The rate decreases, though, to 18 % and 19 % in year 2 and 3, respectively. In venture 
capital investments the rate is lower, ranging from 26 % in year 0 to 16 % in year 3. Alt-
hough the replacement rate is relatively lower than what Acharya et al. (2013) report, it 
is evident that the CEOs are replaced most often at the time of investment or relatively 
quickly after.  
 
The differences between the BO and VC target firms concerning the corporate govern-
ance practices executed post-acquisition, is most likely linked to the differences in BO 
and VC funds’ investment strategies. As previously mentioned, VC investors make most 
often minority investments whereas BO investors tend to acquire majority shares and 
hence take in overall a more controlling role in the company. Another evidence is that 
after receiving a BO investment the CEO is more rarely a board member, in year 3 only 
26 % whereas in VC backed the same figure is 40 %. 
 
In terms of social capital, the descriptive statistics show that the boards of BO target 
firms are better connected than those of VC targets. The average number of board links 
the chair of the board has in year 0 is 25.57 in VC backed firms and 53.27 in buyouts. The 
number of connections other board members have, is also higher in those firms that 
have received funding from a buyout fund, on average 99.53 in year 0. The same figure 
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is 58.77 for VC backed firms. An interesting finding is that the number of linkages other 
board members than the chair have, increases over the years in those firms that have 
received VC funding, but the change is opposite in those that have received funding from 
buyout funds. Same pattern is also evident in terms of added social capital, in other 
words the linkages brought in by the new board members. That means that social capital 
actually decreases in those firms that have received buyout funding. 
 
Another interesting finding is that the number of new contacts brought in the board is 
remarkably higher in the investment year than during the consecutive years. As a part of 
BO transactions, the number of new linkages brought as part of changes in the board 
structure is on average 75.11 and 29.64 in VC transactions in year 0. The figures for rest 
of the years are 20.78, 13.82, 10.51 and 10.98, 10.33, and 7.59, respectively. As Guo et 
al. (2011) reports that improvements are greater if the CEO is replaced at the time of the 
investment.  Hence, an intriguing perspective for further research would be to examine 
whether the same theory applies also for changes in board structure. 
 
A general assumption is that venture capitalists invest in more innovative companies in 
the beginning but also, focus more on developing the firm innovation-wise than the GPs 
of buyout funds. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics imply that there is not significant 
difference in post-investment innovation intensity between BO and VC target firms. 
Number of new patents remains above zero, but the patent stock decreases over the 
years after the investment. The peak is in year 1 with VC targets, summing 1.47 and in 
year 0 at 2.16 with BO targets. However, comparison of new patents show that VC targets 
are still more innovative for two years after receiving the funding as on average they file 
0.33 applications during year 0 and 1 whereas BO targets respective figures are 0.39 and 
0.23. Evidently innovation slows down in both target types as VC targets file an average 
0.08 applications in year 3 and BO targets 0.18. That could imply that the companies are 
more likely already innovative at the time of acquisition and investors aim is then rather 
more on other activities, such as commercialisation of the existing innovations than on 





Figure 5 presents the structure of the empirical part of this study. It shows that method-
ology is divided in two parts on the higher level in this research: to innovation and firm 
performance. Innovation is further divided into two different sections that both utilise 
different statistical method. The first studies the odds for a target to file an eventually 
granted new patent application and the factors that affect the propensity. The method 
utilised for that is a logistic regression. The second part studies the innovation intensity 
with ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression.  
 
After studying the innovation activities of the target firms, the scope is on the firm per-
formance. Here the aim is to explain the impact of the different measures on the target 
company’s performance in terms of sales by employing an OLS method. All the models 
are employed for dependent variable measuring immediate effect and also, the impact 
of changes to one year after. However, it should be taken account that the number of 
observations is then one fourth smaller for the last-mentioned model. 
 




5.2.1.1 Logistic regression model 
The purpose of logistic regression model is to examine the changes in social capital and 
corporate governance have on the innovation propensity after receiving private equity 
funding. This kind of method has not been tested in previous literature and thus provides 
new information of factors that affect the firm’s intentions for innovation. In practice, 
this is conducted by estimating the propensity for a firm to file a patent application in a 
given year. The simplified version of the regression equation is the following 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 {1,0} =  𝑓(𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡).  
(2) 
 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that has value of 1 if a firm i as filed a patent 
application in a given year. Since often applied changes do not affect immediately, the 
same model is run with the same dependent variable led by one year. The independent 
variables are focused on variables expected to explain changes in social capital and cor-
porate governance of the firm. CMC refers to change of the chair of the board and CEOC 
similarly to change of the CEO. CEOM represents CEO’s directorship.  
 
The continuous variables are linked to social connections the directors have and board 
structure. CML and OML refer to linkages the existing board members have in their per-
sonal networks. NL refers to connections new board members bring to the network 
when joining the board in a given year. BS stands for board size. 
 
In order to study the impact of prior investment activities on the future innovation, the 
model employs also two variables proxying those actions. PrePat refers to the innovation 
activities prior to investment as it has value of 1 if the firm has filed, a later granted, 
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patent application by the year 0. Patent stock (PS) on the other hand measures the total 
value of the patent applications the firm holds.  
 
Since high-tech sectors have been suggested to show dissimilarity in patenting activity 
in comparison to other sectors, a dummy variable controlling for those differences is 
applied in the model. Other control variables comprise firm-specific variables: total as-
sets, firm age, number of employees, asset turnover, and EBITDA-margin and investment 
type (BO/VC).   
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5.2.1.2 Ordinary least squares model 
The aim of the OLS model is to measure innovation intensity. The model follows the pre-
vious literature on corporate governance and innovation (e.g. Balsmeier, Fleming & 
Manso, 2017; Kortum & Lerner, 2000). However, alongside corporate governance the 
model in this research employs also social capital measures. Equations 3 and 4 show the 
exact models: 
 
log(1 + 𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 .  
(3) 
 
log(1 + 𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡.  
(4) 
 
The dependent variable is number of new eventually granted patent application filed 
during year t or t + 1. In order to control for time varying differences and differences in 
innovation intensity across different industries, the variations of the model utilise time 
and industry fixed-effects. Models has the same control variables as the logistic regres-
sion with exception to variable controlling for high-tech sector as the model utilises in-
dustry fixed-effect.  
 
The model was tested also for a subsample consisting companies with total number 
of >10 or >50 patent applications prior to receiving investment in order to examine 
whether there corporate governance and social capital impacts innovation intensity dif-
ferently in highly innovative firms, but the sample remained so small that it did not pro-
vide a sufficient amount of significant and unbiased results. However, that would be in-




5.2.2 Firm performance 
Companies’ goal is to maximise the value of their innovations and thus, commercialisa-
tion is an important part of the process after the research and development phase. Third 
part of the empirical analysis focuses on the angle, how the corporate governance ac-
tions employed by the private equity investor and changes in the social network and 
corporate governance affect the commercialisation of their innovations. For this purpose, 
are employed the following OLS equations 
 
log(1 + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑁𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠,  
(5) 
 
log(1 + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑂𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑁𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠.  
(6) 
 
Dependent variable in the model is natural logarithm of sales for a firm i.  is constant 
and each j represents the estimated coefficient. The independent variables proxy 
changes in corporate governance, social capital and innovation. The control variables 
include firm-specific variables are same as in previous OLS model with one addition. 
Since intangible assets include for example goodwill, it is then possible to measure the 
impact of inorganic growth. However, due to multicollinearity between intangible assets 
and total assets, the variables could not be included in same models.  The other control 
variables include number of employees, asset turnover, intangible assets, EBITDA-mar-
gin, and investment type.  
 
The model is tested with random-effects and industry fixed-effects in order to measure 
the impact of differences between industries. Time fixed-effect was tested as well, but it 
did not show statistical significance or increase the overall performance of the model 
measured as R2 and adjusted R2.  
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6 Empirical results 
The empirical analysis of the study comprises four parts. As presented in methodology, 
the empirical analysis for innovation is divided in two. First are presented results for in-
novation propensity and then for innovation intensity. After that is discussed the results 
of regression analysis focusing on effects that corporate governance, social capital and 
innovation have on firm performance. Finally, the results are tested for robustness uti-
lising cross-sectional OLS regression for year-by-year analysis of innovation intensity and 
firm performance.  
 
6.1 Innovation 
6.1.1 Innovation propensity 
The logistic regression method is used to measure the factors affecting propensity for a 
company to file an eventually granted patent application. Table 6 presents results for 
dependent variable at time t and table 7 at time t + 1. The results show that the key 
corporate governance actions, change of the CEO or the chair, do not affect the firm’s 
propensity to file an eventually granted patent application. CEO change is positive and 
statistically significant at 10 % level only in model 2 when the dependent variable is led 
by one year and it is not controlled for the exposure to high-tech sectors. Furthermore, 
the board size does not have statistically significant impact on the innovation propensity. 
The descriptive statistics show that the rate for different corporate governance changes 
is relatively low. That is the plausible reason for the lack of significant results. 
 
Social capital, on the other hand, provides strong positive on innovation propensity. An 
increase of linkages in the network of other board members than the chair increases the 
propensity for a firm to file an eventually granted patent application. The effect is evident 
in the same year and increases the propensity also for the following year. The linkages 
of new board members provide similar findings. However, the effect of the added social 
capital in terms of new board members strengthens for the year after as the coefficients 
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are even higher coefficients ranging from 1.261 to 1.427. The results could indicate that 
as social capital increases the propensity, the effect would be similar to innovation in-
tensity. In that case, the result would support previous finding of Landy et al. (2002) that 
find increased social capital to affect the firm innovation positively. 
 
Observing the control variables, it appears that total assets, firm age and investment 
type all have a positive impact on the propensity to file an eventually granted patent 
application. In other words, the stronger the financial performance and the more mature 
the company is, the more likely the innovation is sustained also after receiving PE fund-
ing. Changes in firm’s efficiency (asset turnover) have mostly immediate effect on inno-
vation and not delayed.  
 
Previously presented descriptive statistics show that most of the firms in the sample that 
operate in high-tech sector have received VC funding instead of BO funding. Moreover, 
according to the descriptive statistics there is not in the end a significant difference in 
the number of eventually granted patent applications. Therefore, it is surprising here 
that firms that have received buyout funding are more likely to sustain innovation than 
those that have received VC funding. Moreover, exposure to the high-tech sector, none-
theless, shows a strong positive impact on the innovation propensity. This finding, how-
ever, is anticipated. 
 
The key finding is that firms that have history of being innovative, have higher propensity 
for filing an eventually granted patent application again as well. It is evident also from 
pseudo R2 statistics as prior innovation activities have strong impact on the firm’s pro-
pensity to file an eventually granted patent application since models 2-6 have signifi-
cantly higher pseudo R2 value than model 1. In general, these models (excl. model 1) also 
seem to fit for prediction of innovation propensity as the values settle between 0.2 to 
0.4 (McFadden, 1974). The values range from 0.364 to 0.372 when measuring immediate 







Table 6. Innovation propensity 
Table presents results of logistic panel regression where dependent variable is a binary variable 'Patent applica-
tion' at time t. Coefficients are exponentiated.  In parentheses are displayed the t-statistics. Model uses Huber–
White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total assets 1.146*** 1.096*** 1.137*** 1.133*** 1.100*** 1.102*** 
 (3.874) (2.965) (3.594) (3.771) (2.811) (2.861) 
       
Asset turnover 0.552*** 0.784** 0.759** 0.760** 0.770** 0.779** 
 (-4.371) (-2.246) (-2.369) (-2.437) (-2.218) (-2.127) 
       
EBITDA-% 0.997 1.003 1.000 1.000 1.004 1.004 
 (-0.755) (0.594) (0.047) (-0.090) (0.720) (0.700) 
       
Employees 1.158** 1.083 1.126 1.160** 1.042 1.048 
 (2.309) (0.941) (1.555) (2.043) (0.451) (0.526) 
       
Age 1.048 0.595*** 0.665*** 0.671*** 0.601*** 0.593*** 
 (0.466) (-3.499) (-3.510) (-3.518) (-3.258) (-3.440) 
       
Board size 1.079 1.086 1.079 1.093 1.084 1.079 
 (1.390) (1.129) (1.106) (1.301) (1.102) (1.031) 
       
CEO change 1.200 1.111 1.146 1.136 1.115 1.109 
 (0.931) (0.371) (0.571) (0.545) (0.378) (0.361) 
       
Chair change 0.943 0.741 0.917 0.940 0.726 0.737 
 (-0.311) (-1.238) (-0.401) (-0.285) (-1.319) (-1.264) 
       
CEO directorship 0.840 1.251 1.110 1.066 1.289 1.303 
 (-1.218) (1.292) (0.652) (0.397) (1.453) (1.515) 
       
Chair linkages 0.969 1.016 1.014 0.992 1.035 1.037 
 (-0.678) (0.281) (0.273) (-0.153) (0.614) (0.635) 
       
Other linkages 0.983 0.821*** 0.876** 0.853** 0.844** 0.842** 
 (-0.309) (-2.806) (-2.046) (-2.461) (-2.452) (-2.467) 
       
New linkages 1.087* 1.141** 1.048 1.060 1.136** 1.127** 
 (1.831) (2.201) (0.898) (1.112) (2.116) (1.993) 
       
Investment type 0.306*** 0.328*** 0.555** 0.396*** 0.441** 0.455** 
 (-5.173) (-3.871) (-2.185) (-3.702) (-2.574) (-2.482) 
       
Patents a priori  1.350 15.170*** 14.368***  1.461 
  (0.838) (15.174) (15.346)  (1.039) 
       
Patent stock  5.844***   6.876*** 5.766*** 
  (7.749)   (14.833) (7.588) 
       
High-tech   1.985***  1.873*** 1.906*** 
   (3.904)  (3.347) (3.391) 
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.364 0.284 0.273 0.371 0.372 
chi2 70.358 338.351 332.557 340.446 297.450 324.739 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 7. Innovation propensity t + 1 
Table presents results of logistic panel regression where dependent variable is a binary variable 'Patent applica-
tion' at time t + 1. Coefficients are exponentiated.  In parentheses are displayed the t-statistics. Model uses Hu-
ber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total assets 1.137** 1.095*** 1.133*** 1.127*** 1.099** 1.102*** 
 (2.470) (2.580) (2.582) (2.641) (2.523) (2.577) 
       
Asset turnover 0.630*** 0.859 0.857 0.838* 0.852 0.870 
 (-3.399) (-1.636) (-1.544) (-1.789) (-1.559) (-1.408) 
       
EBITDA-% 0.992* 0.994 0.992 0.992 0.994 0.994 
 (-1.705) (-1.247) (-1.603) (-1.571) (-1.282) (-1.296) 
       
Employees 1.161** 1.066 1.118 1.156* 1.011 1.029 
 (2.083) (0.724) (1.319) (1.805) (0.109) (0.307) 
       
Age 1.080 0.719** 0.738** 0.740** 0.749* 0.722** 
 (0.682) (-2.299) (-2.479) (-2.478) (-1.889) (-2.232) 
       
Board size 1.089 1.086 1.070 1.090 1.081 1.072 
 (1.272) (0.979) (0.833) (1.076) (0.928) (0.824) 
       
CEO change 0.862 0.625* 0.750 0.736 0.625 0.630 
 (-0.660) (-1.651) (-1.107) (-1.181) (-1.616) (-1.611) 
       
Chair change 0.886 0.732 0.841 0.872 0.686 0.710 
 (-0.553) (-1.173) (-0.687) (-0.534) (-1.426) (-1.308) 
       
CEO directorship 0.765 1.046 0.969 0.938 1.055 1.075 
 (-1.612) (0.230) (-0.169) (-0.345) (0.276) (0.371) 
       
Chair linkages 0.976 0.985 1.002 0.984 1.000 1.001 
 (-0.447) (-0.239) (0.030) (-0.262) (0.002) (0.024) 
       
Other linkages 0.922 0.794*** 0.843** 0.819*** 0.817** 0.815** 
 (-1.211) (-2.781) (-2.218) (-2.616) (-2.474) (-2.493) 
       
New linkages 1.261*** 1.407*** 1.278*** 1.282*** 1.427*** 1.402*** 
 (4.294) (5.298) (4.039) (4.075) (5.452) (5.248) 
       
Investment type 0.278*** 0.329*** 0.523* 0.367*** 0.432** 0.460** 
 (-4.427) (-3.353) (-1.933) (-3.264) (-2.266) (-2.102) 
       
Patents a priori  1.870* 12.631*** 11.982***  2.034* 
  (1.672) (12.299) (12.531)  (1.877) 
       
Patent stock  3.748***   5.009*** 3.652*** 
  (6.105)   (12.360) (6.060) 
       
High-tech   2.123***  1.956*** 2.019*** 
   (3.640)  (3.120) (3.222) 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 1203 1203 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.311 0.268 0.255 0.317 0.322 
chi2 65.564 237.925 227.128 236.224 210.656 231.126 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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6.1.2 Innovation intensity 
The OLS method measures the impact of corporate governance actions, changes in social 
capital and innovation activities prior to receiving PE funding, on the firm’s innovation 
intensity. Table 8 contains results for the models where the applied dependent variable 
is natural logarithm of the number of filed new patent applications at time t. Table 9 
presents results for the same models with the exception on the dependent variable that 
is led by one year in comparison to the independent and control variables.   
 
The results in previous chapter show that chair’s linkages have no effect on innovation 
propensity. However, the differing in terms of innovation intensity; positive and statisti-
cally significant. According to the descriptive statistics, the average number of chair link-
ages is around 38. Hence, an increase of one chair linkage increases the number of pa-
tent applications on average by 0.03 % 6 to 0.04 % the same year. The impact is slightly 
lower to following year’s intensity, 0.02-0.03%.  
 
The linkages of other board members, on the other hand, have a negative impact on the 
innovation intensity. A one link increase in other linkages decreases the innovation in-
tensity at the time by 0.02-0.03 % and the following year 0.01-0.02 %. New linkages, 
however, present the strongest impact which is also positive. An additional linkage in the 
social network of a new board member increases innovation intensity on average by 
0.08-0.12% the year after joining the board. This finding is understandable as rarely a 
person joining the board is able to affect the business or operations immediately, espe-
cially if joining late in the fiscal year. Overall it seems that social capital indeed has a 
positive effect on firm’s innovation intensity and the finding is in accordance with previ-
ous results of Landry et al. (2002).  
 
The dummy variable of prior investment activities imposes negative effect on innovation 









hand, shows a positive result. Despite the negative coefficient for the dummy variable 
of prior patent activities, the results support the ideology of the innovative firm’s sus-
taining innovation; an increase in patent stock by one application the increases the num-
ber of patent applications by around 15 % the year after. The interpretation of the results 
is that PE investors sustain innovation in firms that have been innovative prior to acqui-
sition but they do not necessarily emerge totally new innovations. 
 
The control variables do not show much significant impact on the innovation intensity 
although total assets and the investment type have a positive and significant effect on 
the propensity to file an eventually granted patent application. Total assets show to have 
a positive impact on the innovation propensity, but the effect is insignificant in terms of 
innovation intensity. That could imply that financial stability creates support to file the 
patent application but, in the end, it does not seem to affect the firm’s decision. Lastly, 
the finding concerning investment type is inconsistent with general assumptions of VC 
backed firms to be more innovative than BO backed. However, the result is expected 
based on the findings in descriptive statistics. 
 
Despite several control variables showing statistically insignificant role the models ap-
pear to be moderate fit as the values are above 0.25 for each model alternative, yet the 
immediate effect is better explained by these models than “the future”. However, it is 




Table 8. Innovation intensity 
Table presents results of OLS panel regression where dependent variable is a natural logarithm of number of filed 
new patent applications at the time t. Industry fixed-effect controls for differences between different sectors and 
time fixed-effect for variation between years after the investment. In parentheses are displayed the t-statistics. 
Model uses Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total assets 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (1.077) (0.764) (0.536) (0.200) 
     
Asset turnover 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 
 (2.074) (1.686) (2.149) (1.777) 
     
EBITDA-% -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.736) (-0.641) (-0.474) (-0.397) 
     
Employees 0.005 0.010* 0.007 0.011** 
 (1.130) (1.899) (1.361) (2.240) 
     
Age -0.050*** -0.060*** -0.041*** -0.048*** 
 (-4.842) (-5.172) (-4.047) (-4.143) 
     
Board size 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.797) (-0.367) (0.829) (-0.374) 
     
CEO change 0.012 0.011 0.017 0.016 
 (0.507) (0.466) (0.692) (0.660) 
     
Chair change 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.010 
 (0.451) (0.542) (0.407) (0.516) 
     
CEO directorship 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.011 
 (1.018) (0.979) (0.744) (0.750) 
     
Chair linkages 0.011** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.016*** 
 (2.171) (2.664) (2.475) (2.949) 
     
Other linkages -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.015*** 
 (-3.873) (-2.866) (-3.690) (-2.685) 
     
New linkages -0.000 -0.004 -0.006 -0.010* 
 (-0.095) (-0.752) (-1.175) (-1.860) 
     
Patents a priori -0.251*** -0.284*** -0.251*** -0.285*** 
 (-6.065) (-6.703) (-6.116) (-6.785) 
     
Patent stock 0.392*** 0.425*** 0.390*** 0.423*** 
 (10.865) (11.904) (10.921) (12.025) 
     
Investment type 0.013 0.020 0.010 0.015 
 (0.739) (0.743) (0.557) (0.561) 
     
Constant 0.068*** 0.127*** 0.100*** 0.156*** 
 (3.066) (4.038) (3.740) (3.699) 
Industry fixed-effect No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed-effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 
R2 0.409 0.455 0.417 0.463 
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.432 0.410 0.439 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9. Innovation intensity t + 1 
Table presents results of OLS panel regression where dependent variable is a natural logarithm of number of filed 
new patent applications at the time t+1. Industry fixed-effect controls for differences between different sectors 
and time fixed-effect for variation between years after the investment. In parentheses are displayed the t-statis-
tics. Model uses Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.567) (0.725) (0.442) (0.568) 
     
Asset turnover 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.693) (1.745) (1.819) (1.813) 
     
EBITDA-% -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.266) (-1.080) (-1.197) (-1.029) 
     
Employees 0.011* 0.014** 0.011* 0.014** 
 (1.773) (2.109) (1.820) (2.183) 
     
Age -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.027** -0.040*** 
 (-2.627) (-3.169) (-2.301) (-2.801) 
     
Board size 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.559) (-0.196) (0.558) (-0.208) 
     
CEO change -0.008 -0.014 -0.005 -0.011 
 (-0.311) (-0.504) (-0.173) (-0.387) 
     
Chair change -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 -0.019 
 (-1.013) (-0.897) (-0.962) (-0.835) 
     
CEO directorship -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.220) (-0.252) (-0.338) (-0.335) 
     
Chair linkages 0.009* 0.011* 0.011** 0.012** 
 (1.775) (1.829) (2.011) (2.027) 
     
Other linkages -0.016*** -0.013** -0.014** -0.011* 
 (-2.780) (-2.114) (-2.489) (-1.832) 
     
New linkages 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (3.500) (3.459) (2.415) (2.348) 
     
Patents a priori -0.108** -0.090* -0.108** -0.091* 
 (-2.212) (-1.743) (-2.225) (-1.764) 
     
Patent stock 0.231*** 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 
 (6.106) (5.739) (6.112) (5.769) 
     
Investment type -0.014 0.001 -0.014 0.000 
 (-0.653) (0.043) (-0.653) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.026 0.089** 0.055** 0.109** 
 (1.141) (2.403) (2.119) (2.464) 
Industry fixed-effect No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed-effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 
R2 0.227 0.281 0.232 0.285 
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.238 0.221 0.242 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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6.2 Firm performance 
The aim of the OLS method measuring firm performance is to explore how corporate 
governance actions, changes in social capital and innovation affect the firm’s sales. Ta-
bles 10 and 11 presents results for the focal regression analyses. 
 
For corporate governance activities, only board size shows statistically significant results. 
When the model is controlled for total assets, it appears that when the size of the board 
increases by one additional director, the firm’s sales decrease by 0.19 %. However, the 
effect does not seem to last for the following year. Nonetheless, there is no logical ex-
planation why the effect is evident only when the model controls for total assets and not 
when the intangible assets are included instead. Formation of conclusive response 
whether the results support prior findings, hence, requires further research. 
 
 Social capital, on the other hand, shows statistically significant and more consistent re-
sults for firm performance. First of all, chair linkages are positively associated with firm 
performance, despite the applied model. An additional chair link increases the sales by 
0.3-0.6 % during the same fiscal year. This addition increases sales further by 0.4-0.6 % 
the following year.  
 
The linkages of other board members do not have as long-lasting effect on firm perfor-
mance. A one additional linkage boosts sales by 0.3-0.4 % the same year. The year after 
does not seem to be affected by this increase as only one out of the four models show 
statistically significant coefficient and even that is weak, at 10 % significance level.  
 
New linkages, on the other hand, show a contrarian behaviour. The same-year effects do 
not show statistical significance when the model is controlled for industry specific differ-
ences, but the results are the opposite for the following year. An additional linkage in the 
network of the newly joined board member increases the firm performance by 0.9 %. 
The findings are in line with Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salanick (1978) as the results 
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show that increase in external resources through board linkages improves firm perfor-
mance. Hence, it can be concluded that increased social capital improves firm perfor-
mance and the null hypothesis “increase in social capital decrease financial performance 
of the target company” is rejected. 
 
An interesting finding is that innovation’s effect on firm is mostly insignificant. Only pa-
tent stock shows to have a negative impact, and that in the models that use random-
effects estimator. It means that in innovation intensive sectors the effect applies, but 
when those differences are controlled, innovation does not affect the firm performance 
in whole. The deduction is that firms operating in innovation intensive sectors do not 
succeed better than firms operating in other fields of business. One possibility is also 
that actually, PE investors have not been able commercialise the inventions as well as 
could be expected.  
 
Investment type also shows a positive and significant impact on firm performance. A firm 
that has received buyout funding, generates overall 1.3-1.4 % more sales than a firm that 
has received VC funding. However, when the model controls for industry differences, the 
impact drops to 0.6%. That implies that the BO and VC funds investment strategies differ 
also in terms of industries. Nonetheless, the finding is also an outcome of difference in 
investment strategy concerning maturity as often companies that are already at later 
stage, generate more sales than younger firms. 
 
The control variables show to have significant impact on firm performance as well. When 
the significant and positive impact of intangible assets on firm performance and the in-
significant role of innovation are combined, it can be concluded that PE investors focus 
on other growth activities than spurring innovation of inventions. Since corporate gov-
ernance activities show mostly insignificant impact as well, PE investors aim seems to be 
in financial engineering and efficiency improvements rather than developing the busi-
ness through governance and operational engineering. The finding support results of 
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Cressy et al. (2007) that argue the reason for PE targets post-buyout profitability is an 
outcome of PE investors’ skilled financial engineering.   
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Table 10. Firm performance 
Table presents results of OLS panel regression where dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sales at the 
time t. Industry fixed-effect controls for differences between different sectors. In parentheses are displayed the t-
statistics. Model uses Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intangible assets 0.139***  0.154***  
 (5.047)  (5.666)  
     
Total assets  0.606***  0.626*** 
  (25.074)  (25.511) 
     
Asset turnover 0.064 0.069* 0.047 0.053* 
 (1.411) (1.715) (1.440) (1.811) 
     
EBITDA-% 0.010** 0.019*** 0.002 0.011** 
 (2.557) (5.026) (0.384) (2.059) 
     
Age 1.741*** 1.179*** 1.704*** 1.080*** 
 (17.873) (14.619) (17.134) (13.334) 
     
Employees 0.626*** 0.766*** 0.595*** 0.762*** 
 (4.267) (6.292) (3.711) (5.825) 
     
Board size -0.096 -0.189** -0.097 -0.186** 
 (-1.016) (-2.223) (-1.052) (-2.290) 
     
CEO change 0.243 0.126 0.233 0.135 
 (0.866) (0.475) (0.825) (0.508) 
     
Chair change 0.281 0.158 0.185 0.069 
 (1.034) (0.624) (0.700) (0.284) 
     
CEO directorship 0.175 0.183 -0.047 -0.083 
 (0.834) (0.969) (-0.222) (-0.440) 
     
Chair linkages 0.187*** 0.116* 0.215*** 0.151** 
 (2.722) (1.824) (3.065) (2.353) 
     
Other linkages 0.289*** 0.189** 0.321*** 0.186** 
 (3.081) (2.253) (3.481) (2.285) 
     
New linkages -0.112* -0.109* -0.076 -0.065 
 (-1.750) (-1.846) (-1.205) (-1.144) 
     
New patents 0.257 0.125 -0.090 -0.209 
 (0.712) (0.351) (-0.236) (-0.554) 
     
Patent stock -0.450* -0.520** 0.229 0.142 
 (-1.753) (-2.087) (0.768) (0.488) 
     
Patents a priori -0.132 -0.007 -0.558 -0.324 
 (-0.330) (-0.019) (-1.165) (-0.707) 
     
Investment type 1.373*** 0.641*** 1.296*** 0.611** 
 (4.931) (3.293) (3.861) (2.240) 
     
Constant 3.106*** -1.430*** 7.223*** 2.384*** 
 (6.885) (-4.509) (12.767) (4.863) 
Industry fixed-effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 
R2 0.499 0.593 0.567 0.658 




Table 11. Firm performance t + 1 
Table presents results of OLS panel regression where dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sales at the 
time t+1. Industry fixed-effect controls for differences between different sectors. In parentheses are displayed the 
t-statistics. Models use Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intangible assets 0.065**  0.083**  
 (2.010)  (2.572)  
     
Total assets  0.433***  0.442*** 
  (8.883)  (9.032) 
     
Asset turnover -0.007 0.001 -0.023 -0.015 
 (-0.243) (0.049) (-1.363) (-0.947) 
     
EBITDA-% 0.006 0.012** -0.001 0.005 
 (0.994) (1.977) (-0.147) (0.689) 
     
Age 1.879*** 1.503*** 1.797*** 1.395*** 
 (15.527) (12.870) (14.499) (11.447) 
     
Employees 0.055 0.077 -0.009 0.031 
 (0.328) (0.493) (-0.050) (0.181) 
     
Board size -0.072 -0.183 -0.068 -0.168 
 (-0.603) (-1.593) (-0.583) (-1.520) 
     
CEO change -0.488 -0.569 -0.389 -0.461 
 (-1.250) (-1.482) (-0.974) (-1.162) 
     
Chair change -0.380 -0.427 -0.424 -0.457 
 (-1.121) (-1.309) (-1.271) (-1.425) 
     
CEO directorship 0.109 0.181 -0.215 -0.185 
 (0.421) (0.728) (-0.830) (-0.750) 
     
Chair linkages 0.225*** 0.165** 0.221** 0.164** 
 (2.675) (2.017) (2.541) (1.967) 
     
Other linkages 0.166 0.116 0.224* 0.155 
 (1.447) (1.062) (1.942) (1.414) 
     
New linkages 0.132* 0.121 0.168** 0.162** 
 (1.664) (1.573) (2.140) (2.131) 
     
New patents 0.433 0.293 0.180 0.060 
 (1.078) (0.720) (0.434) (0.143) 
     
Patent stock -0.600** -0.649** 0.082 0.015 
 (-2.005) (-2.178) (0.235) (0.044) 
     
Patents a priori 0.390 0.508 -0.088 0.110 
 (0.849) (1.136) (-0.156) (0.197) 
     
Investment type 1.407*** 0.806** 1.519*** 0.982*** 
 (3.914) (2.529) (3.714) (2.657) 
     
Constant 5.003*** 1.518** 9.589*** 5.991*** 
 (9.497) (2.304) (16.405) (8.342) 
Industry fixed-effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1203 1203 1203 1203 
R2 0.413 0.460 0.503 0.546 




6.3 Robustness tests 
In order to check the robustness of the main results, this study employs cross-sectional 
regression analyses on a yearly basis. Simultaneously, the test provides additional infor-
mation on the timing of the executed post-investment actions. The tests are presented 
for innovation intensity and firm performance limiting the variables to those proxying 
corporate governance, social capital and innovation. 
 
6.3.1 Innovation intensity  
Tables 12 and 13 presents results for the year-by-year analysis to examine innovation 
intensity. Same coefficients show significant impact than those in the panel regressions, 
yet in terms of social capital, the significant correlations show to cluster to different post-
investment years depending on the variable. An increase in the number of chair linkages 
seem to affect innovation intensity significantly only during years 1 and 2. An increase in 
other board members’ linkages, however, has an opposite effect during the year of in-
vestment.  
 
Also, in terms of new linkages, a similar pattern is evident in comparison to the results 
of the pooled regressions. The results for immediate reaction are still statistically insig-
nificant for throughout the observed time-window. The model with a dependent varia-
ble led by one year, on the other hand, shows that the linkages of new board members 
that have joined the board at the time of investment, have a positive impact on the firm 
performance. An additional link in the network of the newly joined board member, in-
creases the innovation intensity by 0.2 % for the following year. 
 
Figure 6 in Appendix 4 confirms the observation that is made based on the descriptive 
statistics that both, the number of new linkages brought in and the number of filed even-
tually granted new patent applications, decrease significantly during the consecutive 
years after the initial investment. That also explains why the results of year-by-year anal-




The robustness tests confirm the significant role of the patent stock to innovation inten-
sity subsequently although patents a priori again show a contrarian impact. Also, simi-
larly to the social capital, the role is more significant in the beginning of the investment 
period.  
 
Models with several lagged variables of corporate governance and social capital changes 
were tested, but they did not provide significant results. That implies that changes that 
are made, by the order of the PE investors, are not long lasting. Despite the brief effect, 
it cannot be denied that increased social capital would not increase innovation. Hence, 
based on the findings of the regression analyses, the null hypothesis stating that “in-
crease in social capital of the executive board leads to decrease in firm innovation” can 
be rejected as increase in social capital increases firm innovation.  
 
In conclusion, the results show that PE investors increase the innovation intensity and 
thus, the result is contrarian to prior findings which suggest that PE investors do not 
increase innovation (see e.g. Lerner et al., 2011) yet follow the findings of Landry et al. 
(2002). Nonetheless, the suggested implication is that instead of emerging new innova-
tion, PE investors sustain the innovation in firms that have been innovative already prior 





Table 12. Robustness test: Innovation intensity 
Table presents results of OLS cross-sectional regressions year-by-year where dependent variable is a natural loga-
rithm of number of filed new patent applications at the time t. In parentheses are displayed the t-statistics. Mod-
els use Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
t 0 1 2 3 
Board size -0.011 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 
 (-0.769) (-0.308) (-0.587) (0.624) 
     
CEO change 0.017 -0.068 -0.015 -0.011 
 (0.277) (-1.368) (-0.333) (-0.330) 
     
Chair change 0.008 -0.015 -0.025 -0.005 
 (0.179) (-0.457) (-0.647) (-0.132) 
     
CEO directorship 0.016 0.027 0.000 -0.017 
 (0.437) (0.924) (0.015) (-0.853) 
     
Chair linkages 0.014 0.016 0.027*** 0.003 
 (1.002) (1.402) (3.006) (0.363) 
     
Other linkages -0.031** -0.014 -0.007 0.002 
 (-2.017) (-1.330) (-0.667) (0.298) 
     
New linkages 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.153) (-0.457) (-0.871) (-0.571) 
     
Patents a priori -0.189* -0.495*** -0.261*** -0.259*** 
 (-1.654) (-5.482) (-4.093) (-3.770) 
     
Patent stock 0.475*** 0.592*** 0.343*** 0.278*** 
 (5.224) (8.824) (6.012) (4.287) 
     
Constant 0.153** 0.062 0.073 -0.011 
 (2.518) (1.278) (1.000) (-0.274) 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 401 401 401 401 
R2 0.526 0.611 0.448 0.408 
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.541 0.348 0.301 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 13. Robustness test: Innovation intensity t + 1 
Table presents results of OLS cross-sectional regression year-by-year where dependent variable is a natural loga-
rithm of number of filed new patent applications at the time t + 1. In parentheses are displayed the t-statistics. 
Models use Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
t 0 1 2 
Board size -0.010 -0.005 0.005 
 (-0.557) (-0.539) (0.481) 
    
CEO change -0.009 -0.083* -0.004 
 (-0.156) (-1.868) (-0.104) 
    
Chair change -0.042 -0.032 -0.036 
 (-0.796) (-0.946) (-1.070) 
    
CEO directorship 0.008 -0.012 -0.027 
 (0.220) (-0.492) (-1.355) 
    
Chair linkages 0.014 0.020** 0.002 
 (1.042) (2.222) (0.296) 
    
Other linkages -0.023 0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.390) (0.076) (-0.111) 
    
New linkages 0.036*** -0.000 0.017* 
 (2.615) (-0.030) (1.691) 
    
Patents a priori -0.099 -0.121* -0.176*** 
 (-0.728) (-1.790) (-2.645) 
    
Patent stock 0.314*** 0.233*** 0.198*** 
 (3.315) (4.470) (3.237) 
    
Constant 0.121* 0.022 0.016 
 (1.823) (0.526) (0.303) 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 401 401 401 
R2 0.358 0.314 0.295 






6.3.2 Firm performance 
Tables 14 and 15 show results for robustness tests of firm performance. The most signif-
icant finding is that linkages of other board members impose a robust, positive and sig-
nificant impact on firm performance from year 1 onwards. New linkages on the other 
hand show a positive effect only in terms of linkages that are brought at the time of 
investment. However, an interesting observation in Table 15 is that new linkages lose the 
significance when intangible assets are not included in the model, yet there is not a log-
ical explanation for the phenomena. The reason why new linkages do not show signifi-
cant results after the first year, is similar to what is explained in the previous chapter 
concerning innovation intensity; the number of new board members, and consequently 
new linkages, do not increase significantly after the most impactful changes are made at 
the time of the investment.  
 
When the observations regarding other linkages and new linkages are combined, it can 
be concluded that the linkages of the new board members (other than the chair) that 
join the board at the time of the investment, affect the firm performance positively and 
significantly at least the first three years of the post-investment period. Since the other 
linkages show a positive and significant impact for consecutive years, the insignificant 
value of new linkages in model 2 at time 0 does not weaken the conclusion. 
 
Whereas Guo et al. (2011) finding that CEOs that are replaced at the time of investment, 
the improvements are greater, the results of this study do not support the suggestion as 
the change of the CEO does not show a significant impact on firm performance. However, 
the result is most likely due to the low replacement rate of the CEOs, as the descriptive 
statistics show. Nonetheless, the above finding concerning changes in the board struc-
ture implies that those actions should be completed at the time of investment as they 
affect firm performance positively at that time. It should be, however, taken on account 
that the finding can be a product of the fact that most changes are made at the time of 
investment. Hence, the remarkably greater amount of observations makes the result 
more likely significant at that time. 
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A variable that shows positive and significant behaviour throughout the observed time-
window, is intangible assets. Furthermore, the impact appears to increase over the years. 
The finding implies that PE investors focus on the inorganic growth through post-invest-
ment mergers and acquisitions as the processes for incremental acquisitions take time 
to complete and to start affecting the firm performance. However, although the impact 
on firm performance in terms of sales, is positive, it cannot me concluded whether those 
transactions have been successful as a whole. For that matter, it would require inspec-
tion of the cost structure, and EBITDA and profit margins.  
 
One of the research questions is that if PE investors are able to increase the firm innova-
tion through external linkages, does it consequently increase the firm performance. The 
conclusion of the results is that PE investors increase innovation intensity and propensity 
as well as firm performance, and the increase in external resources is one of the main 
factors behind the effect. However, the increased innovation is not the source for the 





Table 14. Robustness test: Firm performance 
Table presents results of OLS cross-sectional regressions year-by-year where dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of sales at the time t. Industry fixed-effect controls for differences between different sectors. In paren-
theses are displayed the t-statistics. Models use Huber–White correction methods for standard error estimation. 
t 0 1 2 3 
Intangible assets 0.263*** 0.282*** 0.470*** 0.527*** 
 (4.681) (4.285) (7.732) (8.775) 
     
Board size 0.449* 0.077 0.158 -0.009 
 (1.844) (0.373) (0.731) (-0.039) 
     
CEO change -0.672 0.187 0.651 1.389 
 (-0.878) (0.273) (1.081) (1.511) 
     
Chair change 1.755** 0.079 0.415 -0.154 
 (2.393) (0.123) (0.648) (-0.177) 
     
CEO directorship -0.196 -0.600 -0.516 -0.023 
 (-0.365) (-1.096) (-0.978) (-0.041) 
     
Chair linkages 0.305 0.254 0.220 0.121 
 (1.514) (1.450) (1.288) (0.703) 
     
Other linkages 0.151 0.523** 0.387* 0.588** 
 (0.523) (2.192) (1.667) (2.585) 
     
New linkages -0.205 0.009 -0.140 -0.186 
 (-1.093) (0.058) (-0.902) (-0.988) 
     
New patents -0.769 0.813 0.490 -0.256 
 (-0.928) (0.888) (0.541) (-0.222) 
     
Patents a priori -2.839** -0.827 -1.338 -0.440 
 (-1.997) (-0.728) (-1.169) (-0.400) 
     
Patent stock 1.743** 0.342 0.518 0.226 
 (2.111) (0.439) (0.729) (0.343) 
     
Constant 7.408*** 7.884*** 5.126*** 3.929*** 
 (6.935) (7.372) (3.617) (3.231) 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 401 401 401 400 
R2 0.380 0.343 0.480 0.483 
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.220 0.382 0.386 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 15. Robustness test: Firm performance t + 1 
Table presents results of OLS cross-sectional regressions year-by-year where dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of sales at the time t+1. Industry fixed-effect controls for differences between different sectors. In pa-
rentheses are displayed the t-statistics. Models use Huber–White correction methods for standard error estima-
tion. 
 (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) 
t 0 1 2 0 1 2 
Intangible assets 0.165*** 0.347*** 0.461***    
 (3.026) (4.988) (6.867)    
       
Board size 0.186 0.001 0.069 0.342 0.262 0.400 
 (0.798) (0.006) (0.252) (1.450) (1.228) (1.425) 
       
CEO change -1.261 -0.133 -0.140 -1.103 0.290 0.474 
 (-1.640) (-0.149) (-0.149) (-1.428) (0.327) (0.487) 
       
Chair change -0.119 0.430 -0.345 0.010 0.378 -0.805 
 (-0.170) (0.592) (-0.392) (0.014) (0.522) (-0.871) 
       
CEO directorship -0.130 -1.039* -0.311 -0.176 -1.161* -0.145 
 (-0.245) (-1.869) (-0.516) (-0.324) (-1.955) (-0.220) 
       
Chair linkages 0.407** 0.208 0.142 0.455** 0.218 0.227 
 (2.124) (1.118) (0.725) (2.332) (1.126) (1.048) 
       
Other linkages 0.259 0.504** 0.449* 0.353 0.642** 0.582** 
 (1.006) (2.048) (1.708) (1.339) (2.456) (2.164) 
       
New linkages 0.354** 0.003 -0.118 0.283 0.030 -0.052 
 (1.997) (0.017) (-0.553) (1.570) (0.189) (-0.216) 
       
New patents 0.623 0.413 0.490 0.616 0.637 0.600 
 (0.799) (0.487) (0.521) (0.781) (0.786) (0.646) 
       
Patents a priori -0.653 -1.684 -1.054 -0.857 -1.591 -1.229 
 (-0.581) (-1.283) (-0.942) (-0.761) (-1.218) (-1.002) 
       
Patent stock 0.459 0.626 0.674 0.675 0.825 1.076 
 (0.641) (0.786) (1.029) (0.944) (1.079) (1.649) 
       
Constant 9.723*** 7.726*** 5.394*** 10.569*** 10.211*** 8.168*** 
 (10.325) (6.845) (3.247) (11.516) (9.609) (4.600) 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 401 
R2 0.320 0.392 0.375 0.297 0.318 0.246 
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.278 0.258 0.168 0.192 0.107 





This study investigates the effect of corporate governance practices and social capital on 
innovation and firm performance after a Finland-based company has received funding 
from a VC or BO fund between years 2010 and 2015. The study is conducted by examin-
ing 401 deals for the post-investment innovation and firm performance with logistic and 
OLS panel regressions. The main results are reviewed in robustness checks in the form 
of cross-sectional regression analysis conducted on a yearly basis.  
 
Theories and prior results from research concerning private equity sector, corporate gov-
ernance and social capital create the foundation the empirical analysis of this study. 
There is a never-ending debate in the academia whether private equity investors aim to 
increase the target firm’s performance sustainably in the long-run or to maximise own 
profits for shorter time-horizon. To this day, private equity investors have been known to 
focus more on corporate governance practices to improve the economic efficiencies in 
the target firm. However, since principles of economics state that technological develop-
ment is the key element to sustain economic growth in the long run, innovation has been 
presented to be the solution for the dilemma.   
 
Prior empirical results show that board members’ social capital affects firm innovation 
significantly, but it has remained inconclusive whether the effect is positive or negative. 
A general assumption is that higher level of social capital is linked to larger set of external 
resources and hence, would also improve firm innovation and consequently firm perfor-
mance.  
 
The key finding of the empirical analysis is that increased social capital is positively asso-
ciated with both innovation and firm performance and the result is consistent with prior 
empirical findings. Especially, the new directors are able to create value in the company 
by bringing additional external resources through their other board connections. Com-
bining the results of board size and social capital, it is evident that although board size 
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does not increase remarkably, the changes PE investors make in the board structure in-
crease both innovation and firm performance. However, there does not seem to be cor-
relation between these two effects. Hence, it can be concluded that PE investors increase 
the innovation in companies that have been innovative already before the acquisition. 
However, the increased innovation does not affect the firm performance meaning that 
there is no evidence of successful commercialisation of the inventions. 
 
Moreover, the strong and significant positive effect of intangible assets against firm per-
formance indicates that PE investors focus more on inorganic growth created through 
mergers and acquisitions than spurring organic growth through innovation. Nevertheless, 
it can be stated that the increased social capital the PE investors bring with them to the 
firm, is one of the possible reasons and source for the returns above market average that 
they have been able generate. That implication is a plausible idea for further research as 
the deduction cannot be confirmed without comparison to a control group. 
 
Finally, as stated in the beginning, innovation is one of the primary sources for sustaina-
ble economic growth. In the light of above presented evidences, private equity sector’s 
role to increase economic growth in the long-run is questionable. Nonetheless, that is a 
seed for another research.  
 
The setup of this study could also be extended in the future to examine the links between 
board of directors and fund-level characteristics as well as the board members personal 
characteristics and background. Possible research questions could be whether the num-
ber of linkages and number of external board seats are correlated with the acquired 
share and level of engagement to the firm. Then on the other hand, is the population of 
well-connected individuals homogenous and what kind of attributes are they appointed 
with. In the end, it would be important to know whether there is a threshold where 




Finally, since the insignificant result of CEO replacements is most likely an outcome of 
low replacement rate, it would be intriguing to know 1) what kind of impact the few new 
CEOs have had on the firm, and 2) would higher replacement rate have positive or neg-
ative impact on firm innovation and performance. Naturally, the CEOs characteristics and 
compatibility play an important role to the success so a research of the key competences 
would add value for the investors that review the candidates. 
 
7.1 Limitations 
The limitations of this study are mostly a result of limited availability of the data. Inno-
vation as a concept is abstract and vast, but the focus is here limited to patent activity. 
As previously mentioned, other studies have used before also for example R&D expenses 
but due to limited availability of data of those, patenting activity is chosen as the used 
approach and measure. Another methodological limitation is that the results have not 
been compared to a control group. Thus, interpretation of the results requires caution. 
For example, it is not proven that the new linkages brought by the PE investor add more 
value than new linkages in a firm that has not received PE-funding.  
 
In terms of social capital, the border line is drawn to include only the CEO and the board 
members. First of all, the topic of the study would have become too wide and second, 
the data concerning other external experts and consultants included in the investment 
process is scarce. Also, the data of external linkages is limited to individuals that have 
Finnish personal identification number. Finally, the time-window is limited to start from 
year 2010 as deals before that are not provided in the data set that was received from 
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Appendix 1. NACE Rev. 2 industry codes 
Table 16. Industry codes and sample distribution 
Code NACE Rev. 2 Count 
10 Manufacture of food products 1 
13 Manufacture of textiles 1 
16 Manufacture of wood 2 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 3 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2 
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 1 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 2 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 7 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 18 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 6 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 6 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2 
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 2 
32 Other manufacturing 11 
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 1 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1 
41 Construction of buildings 3 
42 Civil engineering 4 
43 Specialised construction activities 6 
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 11 
47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 9 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 1 
55 Accommodation 2 
56 Food and beverage service activities 2 
58 Publishing activities 2 
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities 1 
61 Telecommunications 6 
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 101 
63 Information service activities 12 
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 5 
66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 3 
68 Real estate activities 2 
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 12 
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 22 
72 Scientific research and development 22 
73 Advertising and market research 2 
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 4 
75 Veterinary activities 1 
77 Rental and leasing activities 2 
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities 1 
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities 1 
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 3 
86 Human health activities 12 
87 Residential care activities 1 
88 Social work activities without accommodation 3 
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 1 
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 5 
96 Other personal service activities 2 
99 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 2 
 ∑ 340 
90 
 
Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics: buyout transactions 
Table 17. BO transactions year 0 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.17 1.42 0.00 7.00 
CEO change 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 53.27 45.24 0.00 180.00 
Other linkages 99.53 83.64 0.00 364.00 
New linkages 75.11 65.53 0.00 273.00 
Patents a priori 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 2.16 8.30 0.00 58.68 
New patents 0.39 1.89 0.00 15.00 
High Tech 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
 
Table 18. BO transactions year 1 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.38 1.39 0.00 7.00 
CEO change 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 50.66 44.75 0.00 207.00 
Other linkages 92.32 77.49 0.00 339.00 
New linkages 20.78 42.15 0.00 228.00 
Patents a priori 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 2.07 7.64 0.00 54.88 
New patents 0.23 0.88 0.00 5.00 
High Tech 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
 
Table 19. BO transactions year 2 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.47 1.36 0.00 7.00 
CEO change 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 55.68 47.06 0.00 205.00 
Other linkages 93.17 83.36 0.00 401.00 
New linkages 13.82 29.19 0.00 141.00 
Patents a priori 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.85 6.70 0.00 47.65 
New patents 0.09 0.46 0.00 4.00 
High Tech 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 




Table 20. BO transactions year 3 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.52 1.52 0.00 7.00 
CEO change 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 52.26 48.90 0.00 210.00 
Other linkages 89.29 80.58 0.00 338.00 
New linkages 10.51 23.07 0.00 117.00 
Patents a priori 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.75 6.31 0.00 45.50 
New patents 0.18 0.85 0.00 6.00 
High Tech 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
 
Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics: venture capital transactions 
Table 21. VC transactions year 0 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.48 1.47 0.00 9.50 
CEO change 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 25.57 32.15 0.00 211.00 
Other linkages 58.77 59.81 0.00 341.00 
New linkages 29.64 41.53 0.00 222.00 
Patents a priori 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.34 2.95 0.00 17.95 
New patents 0.33 1.14 0.00 12.00 
High Tech 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Observations 306 306 306 306 
 
Table 22. VC transactions year 1 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.78 1.45 0.00 9.00 
CEO change 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 31.35 37.83 0.00 231.00 
Other linkages 67.58 62.86 0.00 321.00 
New linkages 10.98 29.11 0.00 212.00 
Patents a priori 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.47 3.21 0.00 26.26 
New patents 0.33 1.15 0.00 11.00 
High Tech 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 




Table 23. VC transactions year 2 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.83 1.36 0.00 8.00 
CEO change 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 36.07 43.52 0.00 249.00 
Other linkages 72.31 66.29 0.00 292.00 
New linkages 10.33 28.34 0.00 173.00 
Patents a priori 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.42 3.12 0.00 23.32 
New patents 0.17 0.83 0.00 8.00 
High Tech 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Observations 306 306 306 306 
 
Table 24. VC transactions year 3 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Board size 3.86 1.42 0.00 7.00 
CEO change 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Chair change 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
CEO directorship 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Chair linkages 38.38 47.82 0.00 275.00 
Other linkages 75.62 73.65 0.00 348.00 
New linkages 7.59 22.42 0.00 174.00 
Patents a priori 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock 1.29 2.83 0.00 19.82 
New patents 0.08 0.50 0.00 7.00 
High Tech 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 




Appendix 4. Graphical representation of new linkages and new patents 
 
Figure 6. New linkages and new patents t + 1 scatter plot 
